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AS WE APPROACH the millennium in California, we can point with
considerable pride to the progress women have made in the legal
profession since Clara Shortridge Foltz was first admitted to the Cali-
fornia Bar in 1878.2 Three of the seven justices on the California
Supreme Court are women.3 Nearly fifty percent of students in law
schools are women, 4 and women now comprise approximately twenty-
three percent of lawyers in California. 5 California has the largest
number of women lawyers in the nation, and ranks second in percent-
age of women lawyers.6 Approximately thirteen percent of judges sit-
1. ROBERT FROST, Stopping by the Woods on a Snowy Evening, in COLLECTED POEMS OF
ROBERT FROST (Halcyon House, 1932).
* Professor, Western State University College of Law; BA Trinity College, Hartford,
Conn.; JD lIT/Chicago-Kent College of Law. I would like to thank my former colleagues
on the Judicial Council of California's Access and Fairness Committee, particularly the
Chair of the Committee, Judge Fred Horn, Arline Tyler, staff attorney with the
Administrative Office of the Courts, and Judges Meredith Taylor and Barbara Zuniga,
former chairs of the subcommittee on Gender Fairness.
2. For a history of Clara Foltz, see Barbara Allen Babcock, Clara Shortridge Foltz: Con-
stitution Maker, 66 IND. L.J. 849 (1991).
3. Justice Joyce Kennard, appointed in March 1989, Justice Kathryn Werdegar, ap-
pointed in May 1994, and Justice Janice Brown, appointed in May 1996. See SOUTHERN
CALIFORNIA JUDICIAL PROFILES, Vol. IV (1998) at 93-3, 96-3, 96-2.
4. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, UNFIN-
ISHED BUSINESS: OVERCOMING THE SISYPHUS FACTOR (1995) at 5 [hereinafter UNFINISHED
BUSINESS]. See also American Bar Association Section of Legal Education and Admissions to
the Bar (visited 10/26/99) <http://www.abanet.org/legaled/femstats.html> As of 1998,
46% of law school graduates were women. See id.
5. As of 1991, California had 24,226 women lawyers. See BARBARA A. CURRAN & CLARA
N. CARSON, LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT: THE U.S. LEGAL PROFESSION IN THE 1990s (1994)
at 46. According to State Bar of California figures, as of September 30, 1997, California had
123,714 attorneys. See State Bar of California (visited 10/26/99) <http://www.calbar.org>.
6. See CUtAN & CARSON, supra note 5, at 45-48.
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ting in California are women. 7 Women lawyers are employed in a
myriad of professional capacities, from law professors to managing
partners of major law firms.8 However, despite these impressive gains,
there is a long road ahead before we can honestly contend that wo-
men in the legal profession in California have achieved true equality.
This article chronicles the tremendous achievements women
have made in gaining access to and equity in the legal profession in
California, and argues that now is not the time for complacency.
Rather, we need to acknowledge that impediments remain to wo-
men's ability to achieve parity with their male counterparts. While acts
of overt discrimination have lessened in number, more subtle forms of
discrimination now occur. Despite their growing numbers in the legal
profession, women are not reaching the highest echelons of legal
practice as partners in law firms, judges, or law school deans to nearly
the same degree as men.9 The protection of the federal and state anti-
discrimination laws will not, in and of themselves, end discrimination.
We are in danger of losing hard-won ground.' 0
In spite of a growing body of evidence showing that all is not well
for women in the law," California continues to be a national leader in
terms of providing opportunities for women in the legal profession
and for devoting resources to the study of gender bias in the profes-
sion. 12 California was one of the first states to allow women to practice
7. SeeJUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON GENDER BIAS IN THE
COURTS, ACHIEVING EQUALJUSTICE FOR WOMEN AND MEN IN THE CALIFORNIA COURTS (1996)
at 107 [hereinafter JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA]. See alo AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
COMMISSION ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, WOMEN IN THE LAw: A LOOK AT THE NUMBERS,
at 52 (1995) [hereinafter WOMEN IN THE LAW]:
Women in the judiciary have made remarkable strides but still lag behind numeri-
cal parity in almost every court in the country. Overall, the proportion of judges
who were female more than doubled between 1980 and 1991 to 9% of all judges.
Despite this growth, women lawyers continue to be underrepresented among
judges at all age levels. The Supreme Court enjoys the distinction amongst federal
courts of most closely reflecting the actual female lawyer population with its two
female members providing 22% representation.
Id. at 51.
8. See UNFINISHED BUSINESS, supra note 4; WOMEN IN THE LAW, supra note 7.
9. See infra Section II.A.
10. See, e.g., Steven Keeva, Standing Up for Women, A.B.A.J., Apr. 1995, at 118 (describ-
ing testimony before the ABA Commission of Women in the Profession regarding the fear
of a rollback in advances). The author also quotes former ABA President William Falsgraf,
who saw evidence of backlash while conducting a focus group of men, as saying, "In other
words, the feeling is that the pendulum has swung past neutral, and it's time to bring it
back." Id.
11. See UNFINISHED BUSINESS, supra note 4.
12. See infra Section III., regarding the work of the California Judicial Council's Ac-
cess and Fairness Advisory Committee. See also infra Section II.A., regarding percentage of
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law, and to require state law schools admit women.1 3 California has
more women lawyers than any other state, and California's large cities
have a better than average percentage of women partners in major law
firms. 14
Part I of this article provides a history of women in the legal pro-
fession, including initial efforts to gain admission to the bar and the
experience of the first women law school students. This part also in-
cludes a brief review of the laws, both state and federal, which guaran-
tee women the right to be free from discrimination in the workplace
and which make possible the current level of successful participation
by women in this profession.
Part II of this article discusses the current status of women in the
legal profession generally, and in California in particular. This part
argues that while state and federal laws prohibiting gender discrimina-
tion in the workplace have certainly remedied a broad range of une-
qual treatment toward women in the legal profession, these laws alone
have not eradicated gender bias or discrimination against women law-
yers. 15 Societal forces and the culture of the legal profession continue
to prevent women lawyers from realizing their full potential. Although
instances of bias have decreased as women enter the legal field in
greater numbers, time and increased numbers alone will not entirely
eradicate the existence of gender bias. 16
Part III reviews the landmark work of the California Judicial
Council in exposing gender bias in the California courts and legal
profession, and summarizes -the recommendations of the Judicial
Council for eradicating this pervasive problem. This part also high-
lights studies and reports of other jurisdictions and bar organizations
including the groundbreaking report of the Ninth Circuit Gender
women partners in large California firms. See also The Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task
Force, The Effects of Gender in the Federal Courts: The Final Report of the Ninth Circuit Gender Bias
Task Force, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 745 (1994) [hereinafter Final Report of the Ninth Circuit]. Cali-
fornia has the most women lawyers in the nation. See CARSON, supra note 5.
13. See infra notes 25-28.
14. See infra notes 135-39; see also Carol McHugh Sanders, Survey: Chicago Lags Other
Cities in Women, Minority Law Partners, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Mar. 31, 1995, at 1 (reporting
that the number of women partners in San Francisco and Los Angeles were well above the
national average).
15. Women of color and lesbians often face discrimination on the basis of race,
ethnicity and sexual orientation in addition to gender. These topics are beyond the pur-
view of this article. However, the Judicial Council of California's Access and Fairness Advi-
sory Committee has established subcommittees to address issues relating to women of
color and sexual orientation bias in the California courts.
16. See Final Report of the Ninth Circuit, supra note 12, at 786 ("Change has not occurred
thus far simply by virtue of the passage of time.").
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Bias Task Force on gender bias in the courts and in the legal
profession.
Part IV concludes with recommendations for steps that need to
be taken to continue the road toward guaranteeing true gender equity
for women in the California legal profession.
I. History of Women in the Legal Profession
A. The First Women Lawyers
In the oft-cited case of Bradwell v. Illinois,17 the United States
Supreme Court upheld an Illinois decision denying women the right
to practice law. Justice Bradley, in a concurring opinion, stated that
" It] he paramount destiny and mission of women are to fulfill the no-
ble and benign offices of wife and mother."18 Other courts in the
country have echoed these sentiments. 19
Women made their way into the legal profession substantially af-
ter they began entering other professions in significant numbers.20
While women comprised a significant percentage of teachers and so-
cial workers, and were beginning to enter the medical and scientific
fields in more than token numbers, in 1920 only slightly more than
one percent of the country's lawyers were women.2 1 Although institu-
tional barriers to entry into the profession had been eliminated by the
early twentieth century, women tended to graduate from bottom-tier
law schools and were denied entry into the powerful world of the cor-
porate law firm.2 2 As one author noted, "most women lawyers joined
17. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
18. Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring).
19. See, e.g., Matter of Goodell, 39 Wis. 232 (1876); see also, VIRGINIA G. DRACHMAN,
SISTERS IN LAw, at 12 (1998). Between 1869 and 1901, women filed lawsuits to gain the
right to practice in at least 17 states, sought to practice before the United States Supreme
Court, and succeeded in getting legislation passed allowing them to practice. See id,
20. For an excellent discussion of the early years of women in the law, see DRACHMAN,
supra note 19, at 12.
21. See id. at 2.
But numbers do not tell the whole story. There were reasons unique to the legal
profession that made it so impenetrable to women. Unlike medicine, in which
women founded their own all-women's schools and hospitals in the mid-nine-
teenth century, until the very er'd of the century law had no separate all-women's
institutions to ease women's entry into the legal profession. Instead, access to the
legal profession was obtained through male-controlled institutions: courts, bar as-
sociations, law schools, and law firms.
Id. (footnote omitted).
22. See id. at 4.
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ethnic and racial minorities on the lower rungs of the professional
ladder."23
California, however, was less reluctant to accept women into the
legal profession than were most of its eastern sister states.24 Clara Foltz
successfully lobbied for a bill to allow women to become lawyers in
California in 1878, only twenty-nine years after California achieved
statehood. 25 She was admitted to the bar in that same year.26 The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court decided in 1879 that women could not be de-
nied access to the state's public law schools. 27 California women were
allowed to become lawyers substantially before they obtained suffrage
in 1911.
While it no longer seems strange to students or faculty that nearly
half of law students today are women, a very short time ago women
were an unusual sight in the law school classroom. As one woman who
entered Boalt Hall in 1966 and graduated in 196928 commented,
[t]oday, the presence of women on law school campuses seems
normal. But not long ago, when the old order of the sexes was just
beginning to come apart, the presence of women was not at all
common .... In 1965, for example, women accounted for 6 per-
cent of the graduating class at UC Berkeley's Boalt Hall School of
Law, 5 percent at UCLA's School of Law, and 4 percent at Hastings
College of the Law .... For women who laid the groundwork for
the later influx of female law students, there was no escape from
the lack of mentors, the discrimination, and the loneliness. 29
Women initially entering the legal profession faced overt discrim-
ination. One law professor greeted his class as, "'[L]adies and
[G]entlemen,"' and then added, "'Let me amend that. There cer-
tainly are no ladies, or they wouldn't be here."' 30 Women had diffi-
culty obtaining interviews, were questioned about whether they were
on birth control, and received rejection letters stating that firms did
23. Id. at 6.
24. For a general discussion of the history of women lawyers in the western states, see
Barbara Allen Babcock, Western Women Lawyers, 45 STAN. L. REv. 2179 (1993). The author
states that, "[t]he quiet acceptance that women found in most Western states contrasts with
a resistance in many other locations revealed in brutish high court opinions casting asper-
sions on women's capacity and competence." Id. at 2180.
25. See id. at 2181.
26. See id.
27. See Foltz v. Hoge, 54 Cal. 28 (1879).
28. Of the 20 women who graduated from Boalt that year, three became judges, only
four had children, and nine never married. See Aurora Mackey, Turning Point, CAL. LAW.,
Mar. 1998, at 30, 32.
29. Id at 31.
30. Id. at 34-35.
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not hire women.3 1 Even Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, who graduated
near the top of her class from Stanford Law School, was offered a
clerical position with .a large California law firm.3 2 No law firm would
hire Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg after she graduated first in her class
from Columbia. 33 Firms would simply tell graduates they were not go-
ing to hire women. 34
Once employed, the situation was no better for many women law-
yers throughout the nation. Women's advancement to the upper
levels of the profession was virtually non-existent; few made partner,
pay was unequal, sexual harassment frequent, and dissatisfaction prev-
alent.35 In fact, women lawyers were made to feel as though they were"second-class citizens."36 One woman tells that she was suffering com-
plications relating to pregnancy, but was hesitant to cut back on her
work schedule because she was the first woman at the firm to become
pregnant.37 Another tells of being the only woman partner in a forty-
member firm and recounts that she gave birth on a Friday and was
back in the office on the following Monday.38
During the years when women began entering the field in signifi-
cant numbers, biased behavior by male attorneys and even bench of-
ficers was not limited to the workplace or the courtroom.3 9
Professional associations, such as bar groups, were not particularly
welcoming. One woman, who attended a California state bar conven-
tion while still a law student, recounts that she was appalled to see the
manner in which women attorneys were treated at the meetings. She
31. See id. at 77-78, 80.
32. See KAREN BERGER MORELLO, THE INVISIBLE BAR: THE WOMAN LAWYER IN AMERICA
1638 TO THE PRESENT 194 (1986).
33. See id. at 207.
34. See id. at 194. One lawyer interviewed recalled interviewing for attorney positions
in Orange County, California and receiving no offers despite excellent credentials. Rea-
sons offered for not hiring her included: 1) our wives would not like it, especially if we had
to travel together; 2) we often use "rough" language, and you would be embarrassed; 3)
our clients would never tolerate having a woman work on their case; and 4) our secretaries
would be jealous. This attorney opened her own firm. See infra note 40.
35. See generally, Mark S. Kende, Shattering the Glass Ceiling: A Legal Theory for Attacking
Discrimination Against Women Partners, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 17, 31-36 & nn. 62-78 (1994).
36. See id. at 31.
37. See Ingrid Becker, The Reluctant Pioneer, CAL. LAw., Mar. 1998, at 37, 38.
38. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, SPEAKING OF SEX: THE DENIAL OF GENDER INEQUALITY
152-53 (1997).
39. In researching this article, the author conducted extensive interviews with women
lawyers in Orange County, California, with a bar association of approximately 6,800 mem-
bers. Many of the women interviewed are extremely prominent attorneys and leaders of
the local bar. Some of the women were among the first to practice in the county, having
obtained their licenses to practice law 25 to 30 years ago.
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remembers that the men listened attentively to each other, but when-
ever a woman attorney spoke, many of the men completely ignored
the woman, using the time to chat amongst themselves. 40 However,
she was in for an even greater surprise. Later that day she overheard
these women expressing their pleasure with the progress they had
made, as they reminisced about the "old" days when men would actu-
ally leave the room when women spoke. 4 1
As of 1960, only three percent of the lawyers in this country were
women. 42 This number remained constant for many years.43 It was not
until 1972 that all law schools admitted women, with Washington and
Lee being the last.44 By 1980, the number of women lawyers began to
increase noticeably-eight percent of the country's lawyers were wo-
men. 45 That figure rose to thirteen percent by 1985, and twenty-three
percent by 1995.4 6
B. The Legal Road to Ending Discrimination
1. Federal Laws
a. Title VII
The primary federal statute protecting women against sex dis-
crimination in employment is Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
196447 ("Title VII"). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion ("EEOC") is the federal agency charged with enforcement of Ti-
tle VII.48 Filing a claim with the EEOC is a jurisdictional prerequisite
to initiating litigation under Title VII. 49
Title VII prohibits discrimination based upon sex in hiring as well
as in all terms and conditions of employment.50 Title VII makes it an
unlawful employment practice to fail to hire or to discharge or to
otherwise discriminate against a person regarding any terms or condi-
40. Interview with a prominent Orange County attorney (who was licensed to practice
law in the middle 1970s), in Orange County, Cal. (April 28, 1999).
41. See id.
42. See WOMEN IN THE LAW, supra note 7, at 8.
43. See id.
44. See CYNTHIA FUCHS EPSTEIN, WOMEN IN LAw 50 (2nd ed. 1993).
45. See WOMEN IN THE LAW, supra note 7, at 8.
46. See id.
47. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994). For a more comprehensive discussion of the
laws concerning gender bias, see MARCIA MOBILIA BOUMIL et al., LAW AND GENDER BIAs
(1994).
48. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.1 (1998).
49. See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 445 U.S. 385, 387 (1982).
50. See id.
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tions of employment because of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.5' It is also an unlawful employment practice to segregate or
classify employees or applicants in a way that would deprive a person
of employment opportunities because of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin. 52 An exception is made only if sex is a bona fide occu-
pational qualification.53 Pregnancy is now covered by Title VII,54 and a
plaintiff can also sue under Title VII for sexual harassment.55
Title VII prohibits two broad categories of conduct or policies by
employers. The first category prohibits facially neutral policies having
a disparate impact on women. A good example of this can be seen in
Dothard v. Rawlinson,56 where the Court struck down the employer's
height and weight requirements that operated to keep women from
certain jobs.57 The second category prohibits disparate treatment of
women based upon their gender. For example, the Court struck down
a policy requiring women to contribute more to the employer's pen-
sion plan, solely because they tend to live longer.58
Title VII represents an enormous step forward in the fight for
equality in employment. As Justice Brennan stated in Price Waterhouse
51. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
52. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2).
53. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e). As a bona fide occupational qualification ("BFOQ") is
generally not employed in Title VII cases regarding the legal profession, it is beyond the
purview of this article and will not be discussed. For representative cases in this area, see
Jennings v. New York State Office of Mental Health, 786 F. Supp. 376 (S.D. N.Y. 1992),
affd, 977 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1992); Fesel v. Masonic Home of Del., Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1346
(D. Del. 1978), affd, 591 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 1979).
54. Section 701 (k) of Title VII, added in 1978, prohibits discrimination on the basis
of pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (k).
55. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (defining what consti-
tutes sexual harassment sufficient to state a claim under Title VII).
56. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
57. For establishing liability under the disparate impact theory, see Griggs v. Duke
Power, 401 U.S. 424 (1971) and Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975). The
recent Civil Rights Act of 1991 codified disparate impact requirements. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2 (k) (1994).
58. See Los Angeles Dep't of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 (1977)
("Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and
women resulting from sex stereotypes"). For a discussion of the prima facie case under
Title VII, see Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); McDon-
nel Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S.
228 (1989); Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No 102-166, 105 Stat. 1072 (1991). The Price
Waterhouse case and the Civil Rights Act clarified the law in "mixed motives" cases. Essen-
tially, a plaintiff can still prevail, with limited remedies, if discrimination was a motivating
factor in an employment decision, even if the employer can show that it would have
reached the same decision in the absence of the unlawful factors. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-
2(m), 2000e-5(g) (2) (B).
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v. Hopkins,59 Title VII's prohibition of sex discrimination in employ-
ment "mean[s] that gender must be irrelevant to employment deci-
sions."6 In holding that different treatment based upon gender
stereotypes constitutes actionable discrimination under Title VII, the
Court said, "we are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate
employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype
associated with their group ....
Price Waterhouse is a landmark case because for the first time in its
history the United States' Supreme Court acknowledged that sex ster-
eotyping is an impediment to the advancement of women in the work-
place. 62 The Court found as evidence of sex stereotyping comments
by male partners in an accounting firm that a woman applicant for
partnership should dress more femininely, wear make-up and jewelry,
and have her hair styled.63
b. Civil Rights Act of 1991
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 ("Act") amended Title VII to extend
coverage to "mixed motives" cases, wherein the employer utilizes both
discriminatory as well as non-discriminatory factors in arriving at the
employment decision. 64 The Act makes it an unlawful employment
practice for the employer to use sex as a motivating factor in an em-
ployment decision, even if other nondiscriminatory factors also moti-
vated the decision.65 This provision is particularly important in
analyzing employment decisions relating to upper level employees,
where several individuals may have input into the decisions, and a
multitude of factors are taken into account.66
59. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
60. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 240.
61. Id. at 251.
62. See id. at 250. Price Waterhouse is also significant in that the Court recognized that
"mixed motives" cases (where employment decisions are based on both legitimate and
illegitimate considerations) are actionable under Title VII. See id, at 241.
63. See id. at 235 (citing Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1117
(D.D.C. 1985)).
64. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1994); see also Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 241.
65. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). This section of the Act specifically abolishes a loop-
hole for the employer that was available under the Price Waterhouse framework. Under Price
Waterhouse, an employer could prevail in a mixed motives case if it demonstrated by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the same decision even in the
absence of discriminatory factors. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 252.
66. However, at least one author has argued that the Price Waterhouse mixed motives
framework does not really remedy Title VII's inadequacy in dealing with subtle or uncon-
scious instances of bias, as liability is still premised upon the presence of conscious discrim-
inatory animus. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias
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Title VII has been held to apply to partnership decisions by law
firms, 67 and continues to be the chief statutory means of fighting im-
permissible gender discrimination in the legal profession. The
landmark case of Hishon v. King & Spaulding68 clearly established that
law firms are prohibited by Tide VII from making gender-based part-
nership decisions. The Supreme Court rejected the firm's argument
that the partners' constitutionally guaranteed right of freedom of as-
sociation would be violated by application of Tide VII to partnership
decisions.69
Tide VII continues to be a powerful weapon in fighting sex dis-
crimination. In a recent gender discrimination case, an attorney sued
her former law firm when the firm terminated her upon her return
from maternity leave.70 The case settledjust prior to the jury delibera-
tion.71 While the firm reportedly settled for considerably less, the jury,
in interviews following the trial, reported that they were prepared to
award the plaintiff between one and two million dollars.72
While Title VII initially provided only equitable remedies for vio-
lation, the statute was amended in 1991 to allow for compensatory and
punitive damages as well. 73
c. Other Federal Statutes
The Equal Pay Act, which became effective in 1964, is an amend-
ment to the Fair Labor Standards Act,74 and is administered by the
EEOC. 75 The Equal Pay Act's purpose is similar to Title VII in that it
prohibits gender-based discrimination in compensation. 76
The Act provides that an employer shall not discriminate
between employees on the basis of sex by paying... at a rate less
than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite
sex ... for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1171-73
(1995).
67. See Hishon v. King and Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 77 (1984).
68. 467 U.S. 69 (1984).
69. See id. at 78.
70. See Edward A. Adams, Coudert Settles Gender Discrimination Suit, N.Y.LJ., Aug. 8,
1996, at 1.
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See Pub. L. No. 102-166 § 102, 105 Stat. 1072 (1991).
74. See 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1994).
75. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1620-21 (1998).
76. See 29 U.S.C. . 206 (d) (1994).
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equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed
under similar working conditions. 77
The only defenses available under the Equal Pay Act are for pay differ-
ences based upon a seniority system, a merit system, a piecework sys-
tem, or differential bases determined by factors other than sex.78 The
Equal Pay Act only applies to discrimination based upon gender, and
not to pay differentials based upon race, ethnicity, or other forms of
discrimination. 79 Violations of the Equal Pay Act are enforceable
through the EEOC or by bringing a private law suit.80
Another federal statute, § 1983,81 establishes no substantive right,
but provides a remedy for deprivation of federally protected rights.
Thus, it is the federal Constitution and other federal statutes, such as
Title VII, that provide the underlying substantive rights that give rise
to a § 1983 cause of action. Section 1983, by its very terms, applies
only if there is state action. Thus, § 1983 will not generally be useful to
the scores of women employed in private law firms.
Finally, Congress passed the Family and Medical Leave Act,82
which became effective in 1993, allowing women as well as men em-
ployees to take up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave per year for, among
other things, the birth or illness of a child.83
2. State Laws
The California Constitution provides that a person may not be
disqualified from entering a business or profession on the basis of
sex.84 California Government Code Section 1294085 makes it an un-
lawful employment practice 86 for an employer to refuse to hire, dis-
charge or discriminate in terms of compensation and employment
because of sex. 87 This section also prohibits harassment on the basis of
77. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (d)(1).
78. See id
79. See id.
80. See 29 U.S.C. §216(b) (1994).
81. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. III 1998).
82. 5 U.S.C. §§ 6381-87 (1994).
83. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 6381-82
84. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 8.
85. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940 (Deering Supp. 1999).
86. Except if based upon a bona fide occupational qualification or if based upon a
federal or state security regulation. See id.
87. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12940(a). This section is referred to generally as the Cali-
fornia Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA"). See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12900 (Deer-
ing 1997). California courts have held that cases interpreting federal Title VII are
applicable to Government Code Section 12940 cases. See University of So. Cal. v. Superior
Court, 272 Cal. Rptr. 264 (Ct. App. 1990). For a general discussion on establishing a prima
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sex, and includes sexual harassment as well as harassment based on
medical conditions relating tQ pregnancy and childbirth.88 The statute
also creates an administrative enforcement mechanism, the Depart-
ment of Fair Employment and Housing, which is similar in operation
to the federal EEOC. 89 In addition, the California Labor Code prohib-
its wage discrimination on the basis of sex.90
California's Unruh Civil Rights Act91 ("Unruh Act") provides, in-
ter alia, that individuals may not be denied full and equal accommoda-
tions, facilities, privileges, or services in any type of business
establishment in California.92 The purpose of the Unruh Act is
broader in scope than Title VII, and aims to eliminate all arbitrary
discrimination by businesses.93 The Unruh Act provides for a variety
of remedies, including exemplary damages, injunctive relief, and at-
torney fees.04 California courts construe the term "business" broadly,
as it is used in the Unruh Act.95 Plaintiffs have successfully used the
Unruh act to allow women access to businesses that had previously
been open only to men.96 This is an extremely important provision,
particularly in terms of women's ability to engage in rainmaking activi-
ties, which are essential to success in the legal profession.
facie case of discrimination under California Government Code § 12940, see Sada v. Rob-
ert F. Kennedy Med. Ctr., 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 112 (Ct. App. 1997). A distinct statute extends
Title VII's protections to the California Civil Service. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 19702.1 (Deer-
ing 1993).
88. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940(h) (3) (C). Similar to the federal law of sexual harass-
ment, the California statute has been construed to prohibit both quid pro quo harassment
as well as hostile work environment. See Mogilefsky v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 116
(Ct. App. 1993). For discrimination based upon pregnancy and childbirth, see CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 12945 (Deering 1997).
89. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12960 (Deering 1997).
90. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1197.5(a) (Deering 1997) (applies to work done in the
.same establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill,
effort and responsibility..."). An employer may be civilly liable, and, for a willful violation,
criminally liable, for violation of the act. See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1197.5 (f) & (g), 1199.5
(Deering 1997).
91. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (Deering Supp. 1999).
92. See id. A separate section of the Unruh Act provides for civil liability for sexual
harassment in any business, service or professional relationship. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 51.9
(Deering Supp. 1999).
93. See Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV, 278 Cal. Rptr. 614 (Ct. App. 1991).
94. See CAL. Cry. CODE § 52 (Deering Supp. 1999).
95. See Harris v. Mothers Against Drunk Driving, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 833 (Ct. App. 1995);
Kirsh v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 284 Cal. Rptr. 260 (Ct. App. 1991).
96. See, e.g., Warfield v. Peninsula Golf and Country Club, 262 Cal. Rptr. 890 (Ct. App.
1989) (requiring a country club to reinstate a divorced woman's membership despite its
policy of issuing family memberships only to adult males).
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The foregoing section, though an extremely brief overview of rel-
evant statutory provisions, provides a sense of the large number of
legal protections available to today's women in the workplace. Formal
barriers to full participation have essentially been eradicated by the
laws discussed above. However, it has been over thirty years since Title
VII was enacted, and as will be discussed below, gender bias in the
legal field is far from being relegated to the annals of history.
H. Women in the Legal Profession Today
A. Have We Arrived?
Since the enactment of the various aforementioned anti-discrimi-
nation laws, women are participating in the legal profession in both
California and the nation as a whole in greater numbers.97 This
growth has unquestionably impacted the legal profession. As Catha-
rine MacKinnon stated:
Although women are still only a small percentage of the total
number of lawyers, and a little over 10 percent of the partners in
law firms and tenured professors on prestigious law faculties ...
their presence, their perspectives, and their advocacy for women
has nonetheless impelled a major questioning of male dominance
in law.98
Women are participating in every facet of the legal profession, includ-
ing the upper echelons-law firm partners, federal and state judges,
law school deans, United States Attorney General, members of the
California Supreme Court, and the United States Supreme Court. If
the current rate of women enrolling in law school continues, women
will comprise forty percent of the profession by the year 2010.99
Women entering the legal profession today no longer face the
seemingly insurmountable obstacles faced by their predecessors just
thirty years ago. In addition to legal protections, women enjoy more
support from the first day they enter law school. There are nearly as
many women as men students in law school classes.100 Many of these
women students will be taught by women law professors.101 There are
97. See UNFINISHED BUSINESS, supra note 4, at 5, 7 (reporting that as of 1995 approxi-
mately 45% of law students are women, and women are approximately 23% of the bar
nationwide).
98. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Engendering Change, CAL. LAw., Mar. 1998, at 40, 41.
99. See WOMEN IN THE LAw, supra note 7, at 6. "Perhaps most discouraging of all the
numbers, because it represents the image of the profession that is projected to the next
generation of lawyers, is that women are not represented well on law school faculties. Wo-
men comprise only 8% of the deans of laws schools, and 17% of professors." Id. at 51.
100. See UNFINISHED BUSINESS, supra note 4, at 7.
101. See id. Approximately 19% of tenured faculty are women. See id
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women's organizations on campus.10 2 When these students join the
bar, they may join national, state, and local organizations devoted to
women in the legal profession.10 3 They will comprise nearly one-third
of practicing lawyers, 10 4 a percentage that will continue to rise. They
will enjoy significant opportunities in government employment as well
as in corporate legal departments. 10 5 They will even find some em-
ployers with family-friendly policies.' 0 6
There seems to be consensus that change has been substantial
since women began entering the legal profession in greater numbers
in the 1960's. One respondent in a survey conducted by the Illinois
Task Force on Gender Bias in the Courts opined that "[t]hings have
improved vastly .... Before... I was pinched, patted, asked for dates,
dismissed as incompetent and harassed by judges and attorneys
alike."'01 7 Many believe behavior that demonstrates the existence of
biased or stereotypical attitudes will continue to decline as the num-
bers of women attorneys and judges increase. 08
Despite the incredible gains, as one author has quipped, "All is
not well for women in law."' 0 9 Women continue to be dramatically
102. Boalt Hall formed a women's law student organization in 1970. See Mackey, supra
note 28, at 81.
103. At the national level, the ABA has a Commission on Women in the Profession.
California has a statewide organization called California Women Lawyers. A variety of
county bar organizations exist, such as the Queen's Bench in San Francisco, Orange
County Women Lawyers, Fresno County Women Lawyers, and Women Lawyers Association
of Los Angeles. If a woman becomes a judge, she may join the National Association of
Women Judges ("NAWJ"), an organization with approximately 1200 members, both men
and women. For a discussion of the NAWJ, see Hon. Judith M. Billings and Hon Brenda
Murray, Introduction to the Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force Report: The Effects of Gender, 67
S. CAL. L. REV. 739, 739-40 (1994).
Some commentators have expressed concern, however, about the diminishing num-
bers of members in organizations dedicated to women's issues, such as the National Organ-
ization of Women ("N.O.W."). Professor Deborah Rhode attributes this disturbing fact, in
part, to the perception on the part of many that gender inequality is not a serious problem.
She notes that the perception that no problem exists has itself become the major obstacle
to moving toward equality. See RHODE, supra note 38, at 2.
104. See UNFINISHED BUSINESS, supra note 4, at 5.
105. See id. at 13-14. Women comprise 35% of federal executive branch lawyers and
55% of junior attorneys in corporate law departments. See id. at 14.
106. See id. The United States Department of Justice provides for part-time work, job-
sharing, flexible schedules and on-site day care. See id.
107. Stephanie Riger et al., Gender Bias in Courtroom Dynamics, 19 LAw & HUM. BEHAV.
465, 471 (1995) (citing from Illinois Task Force on Gender Bias in the Courts survey).
108. See id. at 478-79.
109. Deborah L. Rhode, Women Haven't Arrived, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 18, 1996; see also
Deborah L. Rhode, Perspectives on Professional Women, 40 STAN. L. REv. 1163 (1988); EPSTEIN,
supra note 44.
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under-represented at the highest echelons of the profession. 110 Ac-
cording to the American Bar Association ("ABA") Commission on Wo-
men in the Profession, women comprise approximately forty-five
percent of entering law school classes,' 1' and twenty-three percent of
the bar,"t 2 but only nineteen percent of tenured faculty, 1 3 thirteen
percent of law firm partners, 1 4 ten percent to twelve percent of
judges,1 15 and eight percent of law school deans. 116 Women tend to
be over-represented in certain areas of the law practice, and continue
to earn significantly lower incomes than male attorneys at all levels.1 17
As one author noted, there certainly has been progress, "But progress
is not parity." 18 For many women lawyers, the "glass ceiling" is a harsh
reality.1' 9 Recent empirical evidence suggests there is occupational
110. See, e.g., A.B.A. J., Nov. 1996, at 24 (reporting that women represented 37% of all
lawyers in 1985, but only 13.6% were partners in law firms, and only a tiny fraction of those
were managing or equity partners). The article goes on to point out that while more wo-
men are becoming managing partners of large firms, the position of managing partner is
not considered to be the power position it once was. See id,
111. See UNFINISHED BUSINESS, supra note 4, at 7. For further information, the Commis-
sion maintains an e-mail address at <http://www.abacwp@abanet.org>.
112. See id. at 5.
113. See id. at 7.
114. See id. at 11.
115. See id. at 16.
116. See id. at 8.
117. Women enter government practice at a higher proportion than their male coun-
terparts. Approximately 35% of attorneys in the executive branch of the federal govern-
ment are women, although only 18.5% are supervisors. See id. at 13.
Large numbers of women attorneys work in Bay Area District Attorney and Public
Defenders Offices. Women comprise 45% of the attorneys in the San Mateo County Dis-
trict Attorneys Office, 51% of that county's Public Defenders, and 36% of the attorneys in
the San Joaquin County Public Defenders Office. Legal aid offices and public defense pro-
grams continue to steadily hire women lawyers. SeeJosh Richman, Women Chase Law Careers,
OAKLAND TRIBUNE, Aug. 2, 1998, at 8 NEWS. See also WOMEN IN THE LAW, supra note 7, at 18.
Women tend to have a greater presence in government jobs, family law, domestic violence
work and personal injury law than in fields such as securities, organized crime, violent
crime, and malpractice. See Deborah Pines, Fed'l, State Judges Discuss Women in the Courtroom,
N.Y.L.J., Feb. 28, 1997, at 1 (discussing findings of panel of state and federal judges enti-
tled, "How Women Are Perceived in the Courtroom: Views from the Bench"). As for pay
differential, see UNFINISHED BUSINESS, supra note 4, at 9-14.
118. RHODE, supra note 38, at 8.
119. The federal government has recognized the so-called "glass ceiling." The Federal
Glass Ceiling Commission was created in 1991. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994). See also U.S.
DEP'T OF LABOR, A REPORT ON THE GLASS CEItUNG INITIATIVE (1991) (discussing the barriers
to women and minorities in attaining management-level positions in the workplace).
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segregation in the legal profession-men and women experience dif-
ferent career patterns, compensation, and benefits. 120
B. Evidence of Gender Bias
Gender bias begins early in the career of women lawyers. In fact,
it begins in law school.121 The ABA Commission on Women in the
Profession, established in 1987, conducted a series of hearings in 1994
and 1995 to study gender discrimination in the nation's law
schools.12 2 It found that although law schools are generally more hos-
pitable to women than they were in the past, many women today "still
experience debilitating instances of gender bias and discrimination in
law school."1 23 Women at nearly all schools are less likely to partici-
pate in class discussion than their male counterparts, and students
themselves are responsible for many of the acts of bias.124
During the hearings, a law school dean admitted there is gender
bias in the classroom, in faculty hiring and promotion, and in the
choice of teaching materials that tend to perpetuate gender stereo-
types.' 25 As is discussed in more detail below, women's experiences in
law school are repeated outside in the legal profession.1 26
Once out of law school, a woman has a much lower chance of
reaching the highest echelons of the profession 127 and will earn less
120. See Wynn R Huang, Gender Differences in the Earnings of Lawyers, 30 COLUM. J. L. &
Soc. PROBS. 267, 298 (1997) (empirical study of lawyer earnings based upon imput from
950 respondents).
121. For a thorough discussion of this issue, see AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMIS-
SION ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, THE EXPERIENCES OF WOMEN IN LEGAL EDUCATION
(1996); see also Mairie N. Morrison, May It Please the Court?: How Moot Court Perpetuates Gen-
der Bias in the "Real World" of Practice, 6 U.C.L.A. WOMEN'S LJ. 49, 52 (1995).
122. See THE EXPERIENCES OF WOMEN IN LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 121, at 1.
123. Id at 2-3. The Commission heard evidence of faculty members referring to wo-
men students as "little girl" or "sweetie," male law students denigrating the comments of
women students, women faculty who believed their work was marginalized, and a lack of
respect for women law faculty. See id See also UNFINISHED BUSINESS, supra note 4, at 6 (dis-
cussing the continued existence of discriminatory conduct by professors as well as male law
students, concluding that the experience of today's law students is substantially the same as
that of earlier graduates).
124. See id. at 3. See also Elizabeth Mertz et al., What Difference Does Difference Make? The
Challenge for Legal Education, 48 J. OF LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1998). For a discussion of the Yale
Study, documenting that women participate less than their male counterparts, see id. at
28-30.
125. See id. at 4. See also Morrison, supra note 121, at 50 (arguing that moot court per-
petuates gender bias by indoctrinating students in the "rules" of personal appearance, ar-
gument styles, and a narrow, male-oriented vision of success).
126. See Final Report of the Ninth Circuit, supra note 12, at 799-800.
127. See UNFINISHED BUSINESS, supra note 4.
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than her male classmates. 128 She is less likely to make partner in her
firm, and once there, will receive less compensation than men. 29 She
is more likely to work in government and public interestjobs than her
male counterparts, and more likely to specialize in fields that are com-
paratively less lucrative, such as family law. 130 She is unlikely to work in
bankruptcy, securities, and criminal cases involving narcotics and or-
ganized crime.' 3 ' She will not succeed in the legal academy to the
same extent as her male colleagues.' 32 The longer she is out of law
school, the greater the wage gap will be. 133 She will perform two-thirds
of all domestic chores in the home.' 3 4 She will share the harsh reali-
ties of the glass ceiling with her women colleagues in the corporate
world.135
Despite impressive gains, California is not exempt from the con-
clusion that gender bias continues to impair the progress of women in
the legal profession. The California Judicial Council Advisory Com-
mittee on Gender Bias in the Courts stated in its 1996 report:
The information received by the advisory committee demonstrated
that while women compose a substantial number of practicing law-
yers and that while their numbers are increasing in positions of
leadership, the discrepancy between the number with leadership
roles and the number with subordinate roles is great. The progress
of change in this regard is too slow. Moreover, the committee
found that women lawyers have a series of growing concerns that
may contribute to their inability to achieve full and equal participa-
tion in the profession. 136
128. See Huang, supra note 120, at 298.
129. See i& at 268-69; but see Hon. Richard Posner, An Economic Analysis of Sex Discrimi-
nation Laws, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1311, 1315 (1989) (arguing that disparity in wages is not
due to discrimination, but rather to women taking time out of the workforce to raise
children).
130. See EPSTEIN, supra note 44, at 97-99, 101-02. See also MONA HARRINGTON, WOMEN
LAWYERS: REWITING THE RULES (1994). In the federal sector, the Ninth Circuit Gender
Bias Task Force found that women tend to be concentrated in the U.S. Attorney's Office
and Federal Public Defender's Office as opposed to private practice. See Final Report of the
Ninth Circuit, supra note 12, at 778.
131. See Pines, supra note 117.
132. See Robert F. Seibel, Do Deans Discriminate?: An Examination of Lower Salaries Paid to
Women Clinical Teachers, 6 U.C.L.A. WOMEN'S L.J. 541 (1996); UNFINISHED BUSINESS, supra
note 4.
133. See Huang, supra note 120, at 282.
134. See RHODE, supra note 38, at 142.
135. See Mary Deibel, Glass Ceiling Gets Higher, SAN FRAN. EXAMINER, Mar. 7,1999, at B-1,
B-6 (citing a recent survey by Catalyst, Inc., which found that women hold only 83 of the
top corporate jobs in America while men hold 2,184 of these jobs, that women executives
earn 68 cents for every dollar earned by men executives, and that women hold only 6% of
the so-called "line jobs" that traditionally lead to the top corporate jobs).
136. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, supra note 7, at 102.
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As one author has noted,
So far as facts and figures go, especially comparative ones, the
Ninth Circuit looks good in historical perspective for women in the
law .... [However,] even though there are no tangible barriers, no
statutes or local rules, no customs or traditions that stand in wo-
men's way, we still worry about gender bias.' 3 7
In the Ninth Circuit, of which California is by far the largest and most
populous state, approximately forty percent of the circuit's law school
graduates are women, but only twenty percent practice in the federal
courts.138 While the Ninth Circuit has a greater percentage of women
judges at all levels than the other circuits, 139 there remain some dis-
tricts with few or no women judges. 140 Furthermore, there is a greater
percentage of women magistrates and bankruptcy judges as opposed
to Article III judges.1 4 1
In terms of large law firms, California is ahead of many other
states in hiring and promoting women.' 42 San Francisco is one of the
perennial leaders in women and minority hiring and promotion. 4 3
Los Angeles is just behind San Francisco. 144 In fact, 15.06 percent of
partners in Los Angeles law firms are women. 145 According to a 1994
National Association for Law Placement Examination of 900 large law
firms, women comprise 12.9 percent of partners.1 4 6 This study, com-
piled from the 1994 Directory of Legal Employers, provides a perspective
on how partnership statistics vary from city to city. San Francisco ranks
highest in the fourteen city sample with women as 17.92 percent of
the partners.1 47
In a national survey of women lawyers in large law firms,1 48 wo-
men were asked to rate their firm on possibility for advancement,
137. Babcock, supra note 24, at 2181.
138. See Victoria Slind Flor, The Talk of the 9th: Gender Bias, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 17, 1992, at
43.
139. See Final Report of the Ninth Circuit, supra note 12, at 774.
140. See Slind Flor, supra note 138, at 3.
141. See Final Report of the Ninth Circuit, supra note 12, at 773.
142. See Carol McHugh Sanders, Survey: Chicago Lags Other Cities in Women, Minority Law
Partners, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Mar. 31, 1995, at 1 (citing National Association for Law Place-
ment figures).
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. See id. See also WOMEN IN THE LAW, supra note 7, at 27.
148. SUZANNE NOSSEL & ELIZABETH WESTFALL, PRESUMED EQUAL: WHAT AMERICA'S Top
WOMEN LAWYERS REALLY THINK ABOUT THEIR FIRMS xiii (1998). "The choice to focus on
large law firms was also rooted in a recognition that they exert a significant influence on
the broader legal community in a variety of ways.", Id.
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quality of assignments, power in the firm, family leave, mentoring op-
portunities, and job satisfaction. 149 Some California firms fared quite
well. In one San Francisco firm of 210 attorneys, most respondents
opined that women are as likely as men to advance in the firm, and
that the firm is an excellent place for women. 150 One woman partner
said, "On paper and in concept, this is a decent place for women to
work." 151 Others stated that the firm is "very open to people of all
types,"152 and the tone is "no tolerance for discrimination.."153 While it
was cited that the balance between family and career was difficult, the
firm was generally deemed "better than most."' 54
However, women lawyers have rated some of California's major
law firms particularly harshly in terms of gender issues. 155 In one Los
Angeles firm of approximately 200 lawyers, only eighteen were women
partners. 156 Most of the women responding to a survey indicated that
women with children have less chance for partnership because single-
minded devotion to the firm was essential. 157 Mentoring was not
equally available to women. 158 Business development, essential to part-
nership, occurred mostly in male-oriented settings. 159 One woman
commented that the firm's reputation as a fraternity or "boys' club" is
well earned.' 60 Another spoke of subtle exclusion from social interac-
tion.161 The hours required were reported as brutal, between 2,250
and 2,500, with little opportunity for a family life. 162
Similarly, survey respondents rated a large San Francisco firm as
equally lacking from the standpoint of women lawyers.' 63 Again, re-
spondents perceived that women must sacrifice family life to make
149. See id. at 391.
150. See id. at 233-36 (referring to Morrison and Foerster).
151. Id. at 235.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 234.
154. Id.
155. See id. at xxix-xxxi (listing law firms from highest to lowest rated). For a discussion
of the book's findings, see Frederick P. Gabriel, Top Law Firms Rated for Woman-Friendliness,
NAT'L LJ., Nov. 3, 1997, at A7; Daniel Wise, City Firms Get Poor Grades In Survey on Women
Lawyers, N.Y.LJ., Oct. 27, 1997, at 1.
156. See Nossel & Westfall, supra note 148, at 203.
157. See id. Two of the female partners who responded to the survey were more positive
about the firm than were the associates who responded. One partner described the firm as
a true "meritocracy," and noted that 40% of the newest partners were women. See id. at 204.
158. See id. at 203.
159. See id.
160. See id. at 204.
161. See id. at 204-05.
162. See id. at 205.
163. See id. at 41.
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partner, that there was insufficient mentoring available, and that wo-
men did not have the same prospects for advancement as men.164 In
this particular firm, where approximately eight of the sixty-nine part-
ners are women, 165 there was a belief among the associates that the
women who did achieve partnership did little to promote the oppor-
tunities and quality of life of other women at the firm .16 6 The legal
profession is an uneven playing field. Women are under represented
as law firm partners, are less influential in firm leadership decisions,
and do not receive the same economic rewards as their male
counterparts.167
In general, despite impressive gains, gender inequity continues to
be pervasive in the profession.168 In her comments to the ABA Com-
mission on Women in the Profession in 1995, then President of Cali-
fornia Women Lawyers, Dawn Shock, stated that the glass-ceiling
problem cited by the Commission in its report seven years earlier still
exists in California. 169 While time will certainly ameliorate the effects
of decades of bias, as women become an increasingly greater percent-
age of practicing lawyers, gender bias will not disappear without
profound changes in both society in general and the legal profession
in particular. 1 70
164. See id. at 41-42. As in the survey results from the large Los Angeles firm, the part-
ner responding to the survey had a more positive view of women's opportunities at the firm
than did the associates who responded. See id. at 42.
165. See id. at 41.
166. See id. at 44.
167. See WOMEN IN THE LAw, supra note 7, at 28.
168. See Lorraine Dusky, Male Chauvinist Piggery Still Reigns, Nat'l L.J., Dec. 23, 1996, at
A17. The same conclusion applies to lawyers of color. See David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gu-
lati, Why Are There So Few Black Lawyers in Corporate Law Firms? An Institutional Analysis, 84
CAL. L. REv. 493, 496-497 (focusing on "an uncomfortable reality. Despite a substantial
increase in the number of black students attending law school over the last forty years,
African Americans still constitute only a tiny percentage of the associates and partners
working in the nation's largest corporate firms.").
169. See David Bailey, Women's Gains Minimal, Panel Hears, CHI. DALY L. BULL., Feb. 13,
1995, at 1.
170. See WOMEN IN THE LAW, supra note 7, at 51.
If enrollment of women continues at the current rate, women will comprise 40%
of the profession in the year 2010, still short of women's 53% representation in
the general population .... Not only will women's full and equal participation in
the practice of law be a long time in coming, it is by no means assured. While
overt discrimination appears to be less evident in 1995 than ever before, statistical
contrasts in women's and men's professional status remains significant.
Id. at 6-7.
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C. Causes of Continued Disparity
1. Court Interpretation of Laws Prohibiting Discrimination
Some commentators and scholars have argued that Title VII has
not lived up to expectations and that the law's goals have not become
reality.171 While Title VII certainly opened doors to women in the
legal profession, it has failed to eradicate those forms of discrimina-
tion that prevent women from reaching the heights of their profes-
sion. 172 The primary reason given is that courts have consistently used
lower levels of scrutiny under Title VII when reviewing upper-level
management decisions. 173
While courts have applied Title VII rigorously to lower-level em-
ployment decisions, courts tend to give the employer's decision
greater deference in cases involving upper-level management.1 74
Lower-level employment decisions are more likely to be based upon
objective criteria, making it easier for a court to second guess the em-
ployer's decision. 175 However, courts are less willing to interfere with
upper-level management decisions in which employers have relied
upon more subjective criteria.176 Although courts have stated that de-
cisions regarding employment at the highest echelons are not "insu-
lated from judicial review,"1 77 a review of federal case law would
indicate otherwise.
171. See generally Katharine T. Bartlett, Only Girls Wear Barrettes: Dress and Appearance
Standards, Community Norms, and Workplace Equality, 92 MICH. L. REv. 2541 (1994) (arguing
that using community norms in Title VII cases perpetuates discrimination); see also D. Mar-
vinJones, No Time For Trumpets: Title VII, Equality, and the Fin de Siecle, 92 MICH. L. REv. 2311
(1994) (discussing Title VII analysis in the context of discrimination based upon race);
Tracy Anbinder Baron, Comment, Keeping Women Out of the Executive Suite: The Courts'Fail-
ure to Apply Title VII Scrutiny to Upper-Level Jobs, 143 U. PA. L. Rv. 267 (1994).
172. See generally S. Elizabeth Foster, Comment, The Glass Ceiling in the Legal Profession:
Why Do Law Firms Still Have So Few Real Partners, 42 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1631 (1995) (discussing
the existence of a "glass ceiling" in the legal profession and how it prevents women from
reaching the highest positions in law firms).
173. See id. at 1668-70; see also Baron, supra note 171.
174. See id.; see also Elizabeth Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95
HARv. L. REv. 947 (1982).
175. See id.; see also Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 168, at 585-90 (discussing the difficulty
in applying Title VII to high-level job decisions because of their inherent subjectivity);
Martha S. West, Gender Bias in Academic Robes: Law's Failure to Protect Women Faculty, 67 TEMP.
L. REv. 67 (1994) (discussing the inadequacy of anti-discrimination laws in academic pro-
motion decisions).
176. See id.
177. Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 527 (3d Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 28 (1993). For a discussion of the Ezold case as well as subsequent deci-
sions citing it with approval, see Foster, supra note 172.
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The most noteworthy example of this disparity in the legal profes-
sion is Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr, and Solis-Cohen,178 wherein the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a lower court ruling that a law firm
had discriminated against a female associate by denying her partner-
ship. Despite its declaration that these types of subjective decisions are
indeed subject to judicial scrutiny,179 the court discounted all of the
district court's findings of discriminatory intent and deferred to the
law firm's partners, recognizing that society is committed to "free deci-
sion-making by the private sector in economic affairs." 180
The plaintiff in Ezold introduced evidence that she was treated
differently from the males applying for partnership. The firm made
partnership decisions based upon largely subjective criteria of its ex-
pectations from associates with given experience levels. 181 The district
court found sex stereotyping had invaded the decision-making pro-
cess.18 2 The plaintiff was told when she was hired that she was not
likely to fit in because she was a woman.' 8 3 She was given inferior work
assignments, 8 4 was criticized for being too demanding, 185 and for be-
ing too concerned with women's issues.' 86 The district court found
that the firm had promoted men with similar or inferior credentials to
the plaintiff. 8 7 The district court further determined that the firm's
contention that the plaintiff was denied partnership due to her lack of
analytical abilities was a pretext for discrimination.1 8 8
The Third Circuit reversed the district court decision, finding no
evidence of pretext, and concluding that there was no evidence of
prohibited discrimination. 8 9 Because the court found that the part-
nership criteria were subjective, the district court was required to de-
178. 751 F. Supp. 1175 (E.D. Pa. 1990), rev'd, 983 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1992), cert denied,
114 S. Ct. 88 (1993). For a discussion of Ezold, see Foster, supra note 172. It should be
noted that the Ezold case was not brought as a mixed-motives case as discussed in section
I.B. While it is impossible to determine whether this would have affected the outcome, one
can certainly argue that there are benefits to utilizing a mixed motives approach in cases
such as this.
179. See Ezold, 983 F.2d at 527.
180. Id. at 531.
181. See 751 F. Supp. 1175, 1180 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
182. See id. at 1177-92.
183. See id. at 1177.
184. See id. at 1178.
185. See id. at 1189.
186. See id. at 1188.
187. See id. at 1191.
188. See id. at 1191-92.
189. See 983 F.2d at 547.
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fer to the employer's decision. 190 The Third Circuit admonished the
district courts to avoid invading a company's right to make business
judgments based upon subjective factors that the company deems es-
sential to a given position.' 91 The United States Supreme Court de-
nied certiorari in the case, allowing it to be followed in other
jurisdictions. 192
Although Ezold cannot eradicate the gains made in the Supreme
Court cases of Price Waterhouse93 and Hishon,194 it demonstrates the
difficulty women in the legal profession have in relying on the courts
to impose equality at the upper echelons of the profession. Absent
direct evidence of discriminatory intent, plaintiffs in these cases have
little chance of success because often there is no "smoking gun."195
Most cases will have neither the quantity nor quality of evidence that
the plaintiff in Price Waterhouse had, and will thus have great difficulty
overcoming courts' reluctance to step in and question senior manage-
ment promotion decisions.' 96
Discrimination remains difficult to prove. It is often impossible to
obtain direct evidence of the employer's discriminatory motives un-
derlying an employment decision. Lacking obvious evidence of dis-
crimination, courts tend to defer to the employer and validate the
subjective bases offered by the employer as the reason for the deci-
sion. 197 Accordingly, the status quo is perpetuated, and decisions af-
190. See id. at 529.
191. See id. at 527.
192. See 114 S. Ct. 88 (1993).
193. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). See discussion supra Part II.B.l.a.
194. 467 U.S. 69 (1984). See discussion supra Part II.B.1.a.
195. One author has opined that Title VII jurisprudence fails to give full effect to the
statute. See Krieger, supra note 66. "[T]he way in which Title VII jurisprudence constructs
discrimination, while sufficient to address the deliberate discrimination prevalent in an
earlier age, is inadequate to address the subtle, often unconscious forms of bias that Title
VII was also intended to remedy." Id. at 1164.
196. In Price Waterhouse the Court found the evidence sufficient to establish that gender
stereotyping played a role in the decision. At the time plaintiff applied for partnership,
there were only seven women partners out of 662 at the firm, and she was the only woman
proposed for partnership that year. She had the best record of all candidates for bringing
in new business. There was evidence that male partners had referred to her as "macho,"
suggested she go to charm school, suggested she dress more femininely and wear make-up,
and that she was overcompensated for a woman. See 490 U.S. 228, 234-36 (citing Hopkins
v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1117 (D.D.C. 1985). See also discussion supra Part
II.B.1.a.
197. See, e.g., Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 88 (1993).
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fecting women's careers, which are based upon deeply subconscious
stereotypes, go unchallenged in the courts.'98
2. Societal Reasons
Society discriminates against women, in large part, due to gender-
based stereotyping. Women are subordinate to men in these stereo-
types, and women are assigned the primary role of family caregiver,
while men are seen as the primary wage earners. 199 Although these
notions would seem to be remnants of the nineteenth century, a time
when women were initially beginning to break into the legal profes-
sion,200 evidence abounds that these stereotypes are alive and well in
modern American society.20' As one author observed, "patriarchy per-
sists." 20 2 Unfortunately, such stereotypical characteristics of women
are not compatible with those characteristics commonly attributed to
successful lawyers in this society.20 3 Many women who have achieved
the highest rewards the legal profession has to offer have generally
done so by conforming to the male-oriented paradigm of lawyers-
competitive, aggressive, objective, with a single-minded dedication to
one's career. 20 4
There is overwhelming evidence that women are still primarily
responsible for child rearing and taking care of the home. 205 In not-
198. Men tend to fail to recognize that gender stereotyping invades employment deci-
sions. In the Ninth Circuit study, for example, men surveyed tended to believe that judicial
appointments and promotion decisions in law firms were made solely on merit, whereas
women tended to believe that other factors played an important role. See Final Report of the
Ninth Circuit, supra note 12, at 786.
199. See, e.g., infra note 202. See also Rebecca Korzec, Working on the "Mommy-Track":
Motherhood and Women Lawyers, 8 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 117, 121-23 (1997) (chronicling
the evolution of American family life from the Colonial period through the nineteenth
century).
200. As the paradigmatic public profession, law had little connection with the domestic
sphere, the world of nurturance and tender feeling that nineteenth century women were
supposed to inhabit. Lawyers were ideally thought to be bold, brilliant, aggressive, incisive,
and ruthless in the interests ofjustice-or the client. Nothing could be more inconsistent
with the social image of the 'true' woman in the nineteenth century. See Babcock, supra
note 24, at 2180.
201. See id. See also Foster, supra note 172, at 1645-48.
202. Edward J. McCaffrey, Equality, of the Right Sort, 6 U.C.L.A. WOMEN'S L.J. 289, 290
(1996) (opining that the federal Equal Rights Amendment was defeated in large part due
to societal attitudes about women).
203. See, e.g., CATHARJNE A. MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 74 (1987).
204. See Rhode, supra note 109, at 1182-83.
205. See RIHODE, supra note 38, at 149-54; see, e.g., Mary Joe Frug, SecuringJob Equality for
Women: Labor Market Hostility to Working Mothers, 59 B.U. L. REv. 55 (1979); Suzannah Bex
Wilson, Eliminating Sex Discrimination in the Legal Profession: The Key to Widespread Social Re-
form, 67 IND. LJ. 817 (1992). See also Final Report of the Ninth Circuit, supra note 12, at 850
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ing that our society, even at this late date, is not supportive of working
women with children, one author stated "[c] hild rearing continues to
be viewed primarily as 'mother's work' even if 'mother' is a lawyer." 20 6
Because women have primary responsibility for child rearing, women
lawyers tend to feel more pressure in balancing career and family than
their male counterparts.20 7
Evidence shows that when a child is ill, the mother remains at
home with the child seventy percent of the time.208 Women are said to
work a "second shift" when they return home each day after work.209
Evidence suggests that once a woman becomes a mother, others in the
workplace have qualms about her commitment.210 Accordingly, many
of those women who do succeed in the profession remain single and
childless.2 1' The Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force found that
"[i]ronically .. .women are less likely than men to choose marriage
and parenthood, but appear more likely to suffer negative profes-
sional consequences when they do."212
(male attorney stated that "men are still expected to put their careers first and generally
they do").
This phenomenon is not unique to the legal profession. Other professions also create
a tension between the workplace and the home for women employees. For example, in
Orange County, the highest-paid female executive in the county, Ms. Kathryn Braun, re-
cently resigned as CEO of Western Digital Corp., a major computer company. Ms. Braun,
who had been with the company for 20 years, left in order to spend more time with her
family. Ms. Braun stated, "This company has been my family and its staff a substitute for
having children." P.J. Huffstutter, Western Digital Executive Gives Kingdom for a Life, L.A.
TIMEs (ORANGE CouNrY), Aug. 21, 1998, at A28.
206. Korzec, supra note 199. This article provides an excellent discussion of the histori-
cal and sociological nature of motherhood in American society.
207. See Final Report of the Ninth Circuit, supra note 12, at 843.
208. See RHODE, supra note 38, at 8.
209. Korzec, supra note 199, at 118 (citing Milton C. Regan, Jr., Divorce Reform and the
Legacy of Gender, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1453, 1459 (1992)). The Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task
Force found that about half of the women respondents said that it was "very difficult" to
balance work and home, as opposed to 28% of the male respondents. See Final Report of the
Ninth Circuit, supra note 12, at 848.
There is some evidence to suggest, however, that men are beginning to take more of
an active role in child care, at least in two-parent households. However, women still per-
form the greater percentage of child care tasks. See, e.g., Marilyn Elias, Today s Daddies Make
More Room for Child Care, USA TODAY, June 10, 1999, at D-1.
210. See Adams, supra note 70. During a gender discrimination trial brought by a for-
mer associate against a law firm who terminated her upon her return from maternity leave,
testimony revealed that a partner had stated that women who have children do not return
with the same level of commitment to their careers. See id. at 2.
211. See Rhode, supra note 109, at 1187. See also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Culture Clash in
the Quality of Life in the Law: Changes in Economics, Diversification and Organization of Lawyer-
ing 44 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 621, 648 (1993).
212. Final Report of the Ninth Circuit. supra note 12, at 837.
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Additionally, gender-based stereotypes continue to hamper wo-
men's efforts to rise to the upper echelons of the profession. 21 3 As
upper-level management decisions tend to be based on more subjec-
tive criteria, as discussed above, these forms of unconscious bias are
even more detrimental to women's efforts to succeed. Women who
have young children are particularly affected. As one commentator
observed:
[W]omen's efforts have subsidized the cost of parenting for men.
Men can enjoy the status of parenting while remaining "ideal"
traditional workers who may devote all efforts to professional ad-
vancement. In fact, the joint status of husband and father increases
a man's desirability as a worker as he is regarded as more stable
and mature than his childless bachelor counterpart. Conversely,
the mere status of motherhood diminishes the value of women em-
ployees in the eyes of employers. Motherhood thus exacts high ca-
reer costs for women.21 4
Given that women continue to be assigned the role of primary
caregiver for the family, and given that society values this role less
than that of primary wage earner, women continue to be negatively
impacted in their careers. Accordingly, it should come as no surprise
that most women judges and women partners at large law firms are
unmarried and childless.21 5 Not only do societal stereotypes continue
to work to prevent women from shattering the glass ceiling, there is
even some speculation that the gains women have made thus far are
threatened by erosion.2 16
3. Culture of the Legal Profession
The American Bar Association is on record opposing discrimina-
tory behavior by lawyers. At its annual meeting in 1995, the ABA
adopted a resolution condemning "the manifestation by lawyers in the
course of their professional activities ... [of] bias or prejudice against
clients, opposing parties and their counsel, other litigants, witnesses,
213. See generally Mary F. Radford, Sex Stereotyping and the Promotion of Women to Positions
of Power, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 471 (1989); Rhode, supra note 109, at 1182. This gender-based
stereotyping is exacerbated by the tendency to promote those who are similar in most
respects to the person or persons doing the promoting. For a good discussion of this phe-
nomenon, see Baron, supra note 171, at 271-73.
214. Korzec, supra note 199, at 126 (citations omitted).
215. See NOSSEL & WESTFALL, supra note 148, at xx. See also Final Report of the Ninth
Circuit, supra note 12, at 772.
216. See, e.g., SUSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST AMERICAN WO-
MEN (1991).
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judges and court personnel, jurors and others based upon ... sex. '"217
Furthermore, the resolution went on to state the ABA's opposition to
"discrimination by lawyers in the management or operation of a law
practice in hiring, promoting, discharging or otherwise determining
the conditions of employment."2 18 Despite these lofty statements by
the nation's largest association of lawyers, the very culture of the legal
profession, steeped in years of tradition, is itself responsible for wo-
men's failure to achieve true parity in the profession.
Law firm culture has indeed changed dramatically in the past
twenty years. 219 However, many aspects of the law firm paradigm,
which reflect societal gender-based stereotypes, continue to impede
women's ability to succeed at the highest levels. As pointed out by the
authors of a comprehensive survey of what women lawyers think of
their firms:
Despite marked progress, survey respondents reported difficulties
in every area covered in the questionnaire. On the whole, respon-
dents did not think that the problems they faced would be reme-
died over time through existing approaches and attitudes. Instead,
respondents commented that systemic forces hold back women's
progress and will continue to do so until institutional and societal
changes are made. 220
In its groundbreaking reports, the ABA Commission on Women
in the Profession concluded that law firms discriminate against wo-
men in a number of ways. 22 1 For example, women have fewer mentor-
ing opportunities than do their male counterparts in the law firm
setting.222 Furthermore, women are at a disadvantage in the rainmak-
217. American Bar Association, Summary of Action of the House of Delegates, 1995 Annual
Meeting, Chicago, Illinois (Aug. 8-9, 1995).
218. Id.
219. See WOMEN IN THE LAW, supra note 7, at 1. Approximately 80% of women lawyers
have entered the profession since 1970. See id. at 9.
220. NOSSEL & WESTFALL, supra note 148, at xvii.
221. See American Bar Association Commission on Women in the Profession, Report to
the House of Delegates (1988), and UNFINISHED BUSINESS, supra note 4. The lack of mentoring
also impedes the progress of lawyers of color. See also Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 168, at
568.
222. The focus of this section is on women in law firm settings, as 70% of women
lawyers are in private practice as of 1991. SeeWOMEN IN THE LAw, supra note 7, at 18. As the
anecdotal evidence in Nossel and Westfall's book clearly demonstrates, the importance of
mentoring to women achieving professional success cannot be overstated. Irrespective of
the field, women and men are not as likely to attain the top jobs without the benefit of
mentoring. See generally NOSSEL & WESTFALL, supra note 148. For example, Lucent Technol-
ogy's Carly Fiorina, whom Fortune Magazine identified as the most powerful business-
woman in America, was mentored by Bill Marx, retired president of AT&T's Network
Systems. See Joseph R. Perone, Queen of the Business World, SAN FRAN. EXAMINER, Mar. 7,
1999, at B-6.
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ing department, which impedes advancement to the top levels of large
law firms.2 23 Additionally, women are less likely to be included in the
social events that build collegiality within the firm.224 Women often
receive inferior assignments. 225 Finally, sexual harassment "remains a
destructive problem. 226
Law firm policies tend to assume that attorneys are not primarily
responsible for family and children.227 Billing an excess of 2,000 hours
per year is simply unrealistic for many women with children.22 8 In or-
der to bill this many hours, the work week far exceeds forty hours,
leaving virtually no time for family life, let alone business and profes-
sional development activities. Although men are also affected by this
culture, which is essentially hostile to facilitating parenthood, women
are affected disproportionately. As discussed above, women remain
the primary caregivers in the family. Furthermore, women lawyers as a
group tend to be younger than the men in the profession, since wo-
men have come to the law in large numbers only relatively recently.229
Thus, most women lawyers are between thirty and forty years of age
and still in their childbearing years. 230
Few firms have family-friendly policies regarding maternity leave,
childcare, reduced hours or part-time work.231 Firms continue to see
only the "traditional" lawyer, who works in excess of 2,000 billable
hours per year and who is not hindered by outside responsibilities, as
the best economic choice. 232 Even in firms that do have policies that
223. See NOSSEL & WESTFALL, supra note 148, at xviii. See also Final Report of the Ninth
Circuit, supra note 12, at 807 (overwhelming majority of respondents opined that men had
a significant advantage in rainmaking).
224. See Hishon v. King and Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984) (plaintiff denied partnership,
inter alia, for failing to socialize with the lawyers in the firm).
225. See UNFINISHED BUSINESS, supra note 4.
226. Id. at 18-19 (noting that most firms now have written policies against sexual har-
assment and there is certainly more awareness of the issue. However sexual harassment,
though less blatant, remains a substantial problem for the profession).
227. See generally NOSSEL & WESTFALL, supra note 148. See also Foster, supra note 172, at
sections I and III (arguing that law firms have a one-dimensional paradigm of attorneys
that creates a glass ceiling for women, and that by altering this paradigm, law firms will
gain a competitive advantage).
228. For an overview of national billing-requirement trends, see Foster, supra note 172,
at 1652 (noting that some firms actually require 3000 billable hours per year, which re-
quires the attorney to actually work approximately 4000 hours).
229. See Korzec, supra note 199, at 124.
230. See id.
231. See id.; see also Foster, supra note 172.
232. See Korzec, supra note 199, at 127-28.
Since law firms are basically economic entities, they are more likely to make em-
ployee innovations and accommodations which are compelled by workplace reali-
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are advantageous to women attorneys with families, many women are
reluctant to take advantage of them.23 3 Part-time work or "mommy-
track" options tend to penalize women in terms of pay and promo-
tion. 23 4 There is also evidence to suggest that women pay a penalty for
taking time out of the profession. 235 The combined effects of the in-
ability to attain partner status and smaller overall incomes has been
seen as a contributing factor to women leaving private practice. 23 6
Finally, women are often excluded, either inadvertently or inten-
tionally, from those relationships among members of a law firm that
are so critical to success and the ultimate attainment of partnership.
Women are often not mentored, and are frequently not included in
important informal and social contacts. This is particularly true in
firms with few women. 237 This subtle form of alienation prevents wo-
men from realizing their full potential in private law firms. There is
also a sense that the failure to include women in these relationships
impedes women's ability to secure judicial appointments.2 38
Women are guaranteed entry through the front door of the pro-
fession, but are hampered in their efforts to succeed because of the
reasons discussed above. As one lawyer observed, "[O]ur presence
does not by itself constitute 'integration.' 23 9 The continued "numeri-
cal dominance" of men in the prestigious jobs in the legal profession
sends a message of "exclusion and subordination" to women law-
ties. Only traditional workers, who are able and willing to work the hours
necessary to bill twenty-five hundred hours a year will be considered economically
efficient. Under such a risk-benefit analysis, non-traditional lawyers may be forced
out of firms altogether.
Id.
233. See NOSSEL & WES'rFALL, supra note 148, at 206. At one large Los Angeles firm,
survey respondents concluded that while the firm had a part-time work policy, it was not
utilized, largely because top management at the firm expressed displeasure with the policy,
and those who did take advantage of this option found it to be unworkable. See id.
234. See Korzec, supra note 199, at 127.
235. See Huang, supra note 120, at 297-98.
236. See id.
237. See NOSSEL & WESTFALL, supra note 148, at xix.
238. See Final Report of the Ninth Circuit, supra note 12, at 786. See also WOMEN IN THE
LAw, supra note 7, at 31 (finding that as of 1991, approximately 7% of federal judges and
9% of state judges nationwide are women). "According to the Federal Judicial Center His-
tory Office, the number of women judges sitting on federal courts as of September 1995
were as follows: two Supreme CourtJustices (22% of the Court); 32 U.S. Court of Appeals
judges (13% of the court); 109 U.S. District Court Judges (12% of the court); and three
U.S. Court of Claims judges (17% of the court)." Id. at 29.
239. Mary C. Dunlap, Are We Integrated Yet? Pursuing the Complex Question of Values,
Demographics and Personalities, 29 U.S.F. L. REv. 693, 694 (1995).
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yers. 240 Thus, unless courts analyze partnership decisions under Title
VII differently, society radically alters its view of women, or law firms
change the way they do business, change will be incremental, at best.
III. Statewide Efforts to Eliminate Gender Bias in the Legal
Profession
A. The Work of the California Judicial Council
1. Background of the 1996 Report
The California Judicial Council, pursuant to constitutional au-
thority, promulgates rules for the entire California state court system
to improve the administration of justice. 241 In other words, the Judi-
cial Council sets policy for the entire California court system. Califor-
nia Rule of Court 1001 makes the Judicial Council responsible for,
inter alia, advancing accessible administration of justice. 242 In its long-
range strategic plan for the state judicial system, the Council identi-
fied access, fairness and diversity as one of its five primary goals. 243
In 1987, then Chief Justice Rose Bird appointed the Judicial
Council Advisory Committee on Gender Bias in the Courts. 244 Later
that year, Chief Justice Malcolm M. Lucas charged the committee with
investigating and documenting instances of gender bias throughout
the courts.245 After comprehensive hearings and surveys throughout
the state, the committee issued a draft report in 1990, considered to
be truly groundbreaking. A final report was issued in 1996 entitled
Achieving Equal Justice for Women and Men in the California Courts.24 6 The
report cited the Committee's findings of significant gender bias in the
state court system and in the legal profession, and culminated in sixty-
eight recommendations, all adopted by the Judicial Council. 247
240. See Final Report of the Ninth Circuit, supra note 12, at 790.
241. See CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 6.
242. See CAL. CT. R. 1001.
243. SeeJudicial Council of California, Leading Justice into the Future, (visited 10/26/99)
<http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov> (Online Bookshelf on the Judicial Branch Web site).
244. SeeJuDxCIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, supra note 7, at 33. The Gender Bias Com-
mittee is now called the Gender Fairness Subcommittee of the Judicial Council Access and
Fairness Advisory Committee.
245. See id. at 3.
246. SeeJUDICAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, supra note 7.
247. See id. The Report defines gender bias as "behavior or decision-making in the
justice system which is based on or reveals (1) stereotypical attitudes about the nature and
roles of women and men; (2) cultural perceptions of their relative worth; or (3) myths and
misconceptions about the social and economic realities encountered by both sexes." See id.
at 5.
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In collecting data, the Committee conducted five public hearings
throughout the state, sent a survey to the state's judges, heard testi-
mony from 200 attorneys at statewide meetings, surveyed women's bar
groups, and visited women's correctional facilities.2 48 While the report
does address issues relating to women lawyers and court personnel, it
also deals with substantive law areas of family law, domestic violence,
criminal law and juvenile law.249 The report goes beyond findings and
sets an agenda for the future.250
2. Findings of the Judicial Council
The portion of the 1996 report germane to the focus of this arti-
cle is dealt with under the rubric of civil litigation and courtroom de-
meanor. Specifically, the report addresses gender bias in the
courtroom environment, and points to evidence of gender bias by
judges, arbitrators, commissioners, and attorneys. 251 In chronicling
the instances of both overt and subtle gender bias by judges, the com-
mittee noted that "[i]n the final analysis, a judge is simply a former
law student and a former lawyer. A judge often reflects the accepted
social and ethical rules of the legal culture." 252 Although the commit-
tee documented instances of gender bias by bench officers, it found
that examples of gender biased conduct by attorneys abound, both
more frequently and more severely than those involving members of
the judiciary.253
Regarding the judiciary, the Committee found conduct evidenc-
ing gender bias occasionally resulted in discipline by the Commission
on Judicial Performance. 25 4 More often, however, the overt as well as
248. See id. at 5.
249. See id. at 6.
250. See id.
251. See id. at 17-18.
252. Id. at 51. Former California State Bar President Margaret Morrow, who at the time
of the hearings was president of the Los Angeles County Bar Association, explained why
the report must focus on judicial behavior: "'It is they who set the tone. It is they who
control the participants. It is they who define the boundaries of appropriate and inappro-
priate conduct, and they, who in many cases, make the ultimate decision as to the rights
and responsibilities of the litigants.'" Id. at 53.
253. See id. at 18. Although beyond the scope of this article, the Judicial Council also
studied gender bias directed against court staff. There continues to be evidence that court
staff is not immune from gender discrimination in employment. There have been allega-
tions of sexual harassment brought by court staff against California bench officers. See, e.g.,
Matthew Heller, The Lonesome Quest, CAL. LAw., June 1999, at 51 (discussing a sexual harass-
ment complaint by a court administrator against two judges).
254. See id.
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subtle acts of gender bias go unpunished. 255 Examples of biased be-
havior by members of the bench included openly hostile behavior to-
ward women, a focus on the personal appearance of women in the
courtroom, failure to extend common courtesies to women, sexual in-
nuendo and dirty jokes, failure to intervene when others in the court-
room engage in conduct constituting gender bias, and use of terms of
endearment to refer to women in the courtroom.256
The findings of gender biased conduct of bench officers resulted
in five recommendations to the Judicial Council. 257 A central theme
of the recommendations is the need for judicial education.2 58 The
recommendations also urge other organizations, such as the Califor-
nia Judges Association and the State Bar, to enact rules prohibiting
judicial manifestations of gender bias, and mandating that judges pro-
hibit such conduct by those under the judge's control. 259 The Com-
mittee is implementing these recommendations, and much progress
has already been achieved.
With regard to attorney behavior, the Committee found it more
egregious and offensive than judicial conduct.260 The Committee
found examples of gender biased conduct which focused on the per-
sonal appearance of women in the courtroom, use of gender issues as
a trial tactic, expressions that women should not be lawyers and are
inferior advocates, and discrimination against women in bar activi-
ties. 261 Many of these acts were "committed with the encouragement
or participation of the judge."262 The Committee also found that the
profession had failed to respond adequately to the "difficulties of bal-
ancing home and family"2 6 3 resulting in women perceiving they had
less advancement opportunities than men.26 4
The Committee made five recommendations to the Judicial
Council regarding gender-biased conduct by attorneys.265 The recom-
255. See id.
256. See id. Other examples include reliance upon stereotypes about women, adopting
a fatherly tone toward women, hostility or impatience toward causes of action such as sex-
ual discrimination or harassment, unequal extension of professional courtesies, and impo-
sition of unequal standards of advocacy. See id.
257. See id. at 55-81.
258. See id. at 20.
259. See id. at 55-74.
260. See id. at 83.
261. See id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 84.
264. See id.
265. See id. at 84-106.
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mendations range from suggestions that appropriate agencies engage
in attorney education and promulgate rules of professional responsi-
bility prohibiting gender bias, to the use of gender-neutral language
in court papers and instructions, to adoption of rules insuring women
attorneys are not discriminated against in court appointments. 266
Although the focus of the Judicial Council report is on gender
bias in the courtroom and in the decision-making process, the Com-
mittee found that bias in the employment context is an overriding
concern for women throughout the state. Accordingly, the report ad-
dresses this issue in both its findings and recommendations. 267 In ad-
dition to the results of the Committee's surveys and hearings, the
Committee reviewed studies by both the ABA as well as local bar as-
sociations throughout California.268 The Committee found that
although women compose a substantial number of practicing lawyers
and have made gains in terms of acquiring leadership positions within
the profession, there remains too great a discrepancy between the
number with leadership roles and the number with subordinate roles,
with a slow rate of progress in closing this gap.269
In reviewing statistical data compiled by local bar associations in
California, the Committee found that women lawyers in California are
generally faring better than the rest of the nation, but still are under-
represented at the partner level in firms.270 This situation is much
worse outside of major urban areas. In Fresno, for example, the com-
mittee reported only one woman made partner among the 168 attor-
neys in large firms.2 71 Furthermore, women tended to be over-
represented in public sector employment (although not in leadership
positions) and in small firms.272
The Committee identified three primary reasons which contrib-
ute to women's inability to achieve equal participation in the legal
profession: (1) fewer opportunities for advancement and promotion
for women than for men due to lack of mentors, difficulties in rain-
making, gender stereotyping, and lack of participation in firm man-
agement; (2) difficulties in balancing home and career; and (3)
sexual harassment in the workplace. 273 Citing other statistical surveys,
266. See id.
267. See id. at 99-105.
268. See id. at 100-02.
269. See id. at 102.
270. See id. at 100-02.
271. See id. at 101.
272. See id. at 101-02.
273. See id. at 102.
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the Committeenoted that ninety-six percent of California women sur-
veyed believed they had more difficulty than their male counterparts
in balancing work and family responsibilities, sixty-two percent be-
lieved that they had fewer chances for advancement than did men,
and eighty-nine percent said that their employer did not provide child
care benefits. 274 Of the women surveyed, twenty-five percent had been
harassed in a previous job, and believed sexual harassment exists in
the profession in general.27 5
One woman at the Los Angeles hearings testified as follows:
The final straw for me came when I was informed in substance that
there were no complaints about the number of hours I billed for
the firm, but the firm objected to me spending time away from the
office and performing duties away from the office when my daugh-
ter, who has a severe health problem, was hospitalized or ill. In
substance my long days and my long nights were not enough. I was
offered a choice, neglect my daughter's needs or leave the firm. I
chose the latter.276
As a result of its hearings and surveys, the Committee recommended
that the State Bar adopt a Rule of Professional Responsibility relating
to sexual harassment and sexual discrimination in employment, and
that the State Bar adopt the recommendations of the Women in Law
Committee. 277 The Committee also recommended that the State Bar
discourage attorneys from using clubs for business purposes that prac-
tice invidious discrimination. 278
In its concluding comments, the Committee noted that the evi-
dence gathered "pointed to one, inescapable conclusion: substantial
amelioration of the problem of gender-biased conduct in the court-
room would be accomplished if more women were appointed to the
bench."279 The Committee stated that the percentage of women
judges in the state fails to approximate the percentage of women in
the legal profession or in society.280 Citing anecdotal evidence from
the hearings and surveys, scholarly literature, and the results of a Cali-
274. See id. The Committee also heard evidence that women were discriminated against
in local bar association activities. See id. at 90.
275. See id. at 102.
276. Id. at 103.
277. See id. at 99.
278. See id. at 105.
279. Id. at 106. Women tend to be underrepresented on both the federal as well as
state bench. For example, as of 1996, only 12 of the 109 judges of the Third Circuit were
women. See Report of the Third Circuit Task Force on Equal Treatment in the Court, 42 VILL. L.
REv. 1355, 1369 (1997) [hereinafter Report of the Third Circuit Task Force].
280. See id. at 107.
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forniajudge's Survey,281 the Committee stated that "women bring dif-
ferent attitudes and perceptions to the bench," and that "society is
entitled to the benefits of those different perceptions." 282
In addition to the comprehensive report and implementation
plan, in May 1997 the Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court
requested all presiding judges in the state to offer broad-based fair-
ness courses focusing on gender, race, ethnicity, sexual orientation
and disabilities to all bench officers and staff2 8 3 A curriculum has
been prepared and is now available. 284 Furthermore, a sexual harass-
ment awareness and prevention curriculum has been prepared for
bench officers and staff, and pilot training sessions have begun. 285 To
date, the Committee has substantially implemented the report's
recommendations. 28 6
B. Reports of Other Jurisdictions and Organizations
As noted in the preceding section, the findings of the Judicial
Council are certainly reinforced by the findings of other jurisdictions
and organizations. Although anecdotal evidence abounded, courts
and bar organizations did not begin to study gender bias in earnest
until the 1980's.287 State gender bias task forces took the lead, with
federal circuits following.2 88 The methodology employed by most of
these task forces, including surveys, public hearings and empirical
studies, has produced a vast amount of information documenting the
existence of gender bias.28 9
Most states, and federal circuits, have conducted comprehensive
studies of gender bias within their jurisdictions, with findings similar
to those of California. 290 The Ninth and Third Circuits have published
281. See id. at 106-09.
282. Id. at 109.
283. SeeJudicial Council of California, Administrative Office of the Courts, Year in Re-
view: Keeping California Courts Fair and Accessible, ANN. REP. Vol. III, at 18 (1998).
284. See id. at 18.
285. See id. at 23.
286. See id. at 18. See also Minutes of the Judicial Council as well as the minutes of the
Access and Fairness Advisory Committee and Gender Fairness Subcommittee (on file with
the Administrative Office of the Courts in San Francisco).
287. For a discussion of the history of the efforts by courts and other organizations to
study gender bias in the courts and legal field, see Billings & Murray, supra note 103, at
739-42.
288. See id. at 739-42. New Jersey was the first state to create a task force. New York,
Rhode Island, and Arizona were next. See id. at 740.
289. See id. at 741.
290. For a discussion of state and federal gender bias reports, including a discussion of
the impetus for the original federal studies, see Vicki C. Jackson, What Judges Can Learn from
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significant reports documenting gender bias in their respective cir-
cuits. 29'Additionally, national and local bar associations conducted
studies of their own. For example, in 1989, the State Bar of Califor-
nia's Committee on Women in the Law conducted a comprehensive
survey of women lawyers and the practice of law in California.292 The
findings painted a picture of widespread bias in the profession, de-
spite notable recent gains.2 93 Even county bar associations have con-
ducted studies. For example, the Santa Clara County Bar Association
conducted a survey of its members in 1991.294 Universities have also
funded studies.2 95
Gender Bias Task Force Studies, 81 JUDICATURE 15, July-Aug. 1997, noting that most of the
states and over half of the federal circuits have published gender bias reports. Professor
Jackson stated, "Society is pervasively organized around gender categories, and we can all
harbor stereotypes of which we may be unconscious. The best of the task force reports help
readers come to a better awareness of this possibility and thereby permit them to work
harder towards objectivity and impartiality." Id. at 18. See also Lynn Hecht Schafran, Will
Inquiry Produce Action? Studying the Effects of Gender in the Federal Courts, 32 U. RICH. L. REv
615 (1998).
In analyzing the data of the Illinois Task Force on Gender Bias in the Courts, which
showed that 74% of women lawyer survey participants answered that they had experienced
some form of gender bias in the courtroom over the previous 12 month period, authors
Stephanie Riger, Pennie Foster-Fishman, Julie Nelson-Kuna and Barbara Curran con-
cluded that women consistently perceive bias more than men. See Riger et al., supra note
107, at 476-78.
For examples of other reports, see, e.g., Gender Committee Report to D.C. Circuit Task Force
on Gender, Race and Ethnic Bias, 84 GEO. L. J. 1657 (1996); Florida Supreme Court Gender Bias
Study, 42 FLA. L. Rv. 803 (1990); Report of the New York Task Force on Women in the Courts, 15
FoRm-tAM URB. L.J. 11 (1986).
291. See Final Report of the Ninth Circuit, supra note 12; Report of the Third Circuit Task
Force, supra note 279.
292. See LAIDLAW & KIPNIS ASSOCIATES, WOMEN LAWYERS AND THE PRACTICE OF LAw IN
CALIFORNIA (1989). (survey conducted for the State Bar of California, Committee on Wo-
men in the Law, in conjunction with the Legal Aid Society of San Francisco). See also Bill-
ings & Murray supra note 103, at 742-43 (1994).
[A]lthough judges were willing to acknowledge that gender bias might exist in
other states, they asserted that gender bias was not an issue in their own state. It
became necessary to establish task forces in almost every state, notwithstanding
that the ultimate findings and conclusions of each task force were almost identi-
cal to those of earlier reports.
Id.
293. See id. Many of these findings are cited in the Judicial Council Report. SEE Judicial
Council of California, supra note 7.
294. See State Bar of California (visited 11/4/99) <http://www.calbar.org/2pub/
3bibgend.htm> (Survey of all Attorneys in Santa Clara County Regarding Gender Bias, SANTA
CLARA COUNTY B. Ass'N (Winter 1991)).
295. See, e.g., Riger et al., supra note 107 (study funded by the Office of Social Science
Research, University of Illinois at Chicago, constituting a second analysis of the data col-
lected by the Illinois Task Force on Gender Bias in the Courts).
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The Ninth Circuit's gender bias study was viewed as truly ground-
breaking. The study by the nation's largest federal circuit was the first
of its kind by a federal circuit, though many states had already con-
ducted studies of their own.2 9 6 The survey found pervasive gender bias
in the circuit, from selection of'judges, to the majority of the circuit's
women lawyers who suffered sexual harassment, as well as the makeup
of the federal bar.2 97 The majority of women surveyed believed that
their gender impeded their ability to make partner in their firms. 2 9 8
The findings of the Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force were
consistent with those of the California Judicial Council, in that overt
acts of gender bias by bench officers were infrequent, but more subtle
forms of bias persisted, particularly in informal settings such as in-
chambers conferences. 299 One woman stated that "[g]ender bias is
alive and well. It has just gone underground. '" 30 0 Male lawyers were
found to engage in more overt and egregious acts of gender bias than
were male judges. 30 1 The report made many recommendations, all of
which were adopted by the Judicial Council.30 2 Implementation of the
report's recommendations has begun in earnest.3 0 3
The Third Circuit Task Force surveyed court employees, judges,
and attorneys and found that, while progress had been achieved in
the Circuit, a significant number of respondents perceived differential
treatment based upon gender.30 4 Respondents agreed that judges
296. For a general discussion of the Ninth Circuit study, see Slind Flor, supra note 136,
at 3;Judith Resnick, "Naturally" Without Gender: Women, Jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts, 66
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1682, 1693 (1991).
297. See Slind Flor, supra note 138; see also Ninth Circuit Task Force on Gender Bias,
Executive Summary of the Preliminary Report of the Ninth Circuit Task Force on Gender Bias, 45
STAN. L. REv. 2153, 2171-72 (1993). "Gender can have an effect on one as litigant, witness,
lawyer, employee, or judge with regard both to process and substantive outcome. Gender
plays a role-in the appointments process, in interactions in and outside the courtroom, in
the work one does, and in federal adjudication." Id.
298. See Final Report of the Ninth Circuit, supra note 12, at 803.
299. See Hon. Dorothy W. Nelson, Introduction to the Effects of Gender in the Federal Courts:
The Final Report of the Ninth Circuit GenderBias Task Force, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 731, 733 (1994).
300. Ninth Circuit Task Force on Gender Bias, supra note 297, at 2173.
301. See Nelson, supra note 299, at 733 (citing Lynn Hecht Schafran, Overwhelming Evi-
dence: Reports on Gender Bias in the Courts, TPuAL, Feb. 1990, at 28-32) (instances include
demeaning forms of address, sexist remarks and jokes, unwanted touching, verbal and
physical sexual harassment, and inappropriate commentary on appearance).
302. See Schafran, supra note 290, at 637.
303. See id. at 637-38.
304. See Report of the Third Circuit Task Force, supra note 279, at 1380-87. The authors
noted that women were increasingly well-represented among bankruptcy judges, magis-
trates and law clerks. However, as of 1996, only 12 of the 109 Article III judges were wo-
men. See id. at 1369.
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treat men attorneys slightly better than women attorneys, and women
attorneys were more likely than men attorneys to have recognized
judges behaving in a demeaning or disparaging manner toward wo-
men.30 5 Further, a number of respondents believed that judges at all
levels of the court system were less respectful to women attorneys than
men attorneys.3 0 6 The Report recommended, inter alia, education for
all levels of court personnel, publication by each court of the proce-
dures for resolving complaints of unequal treatment, and an examina-
tion of the manner in which court appointments are made.307
Some of the most seminal work in this area has been conducted
under the auspices of the American Bar Association. The ABA Com-
mission on Women in the Profession was established in 1987 to "iden-
tify barriers to their advancement, and make recommendations on
how to eliminate those barriers. ' 30 8 In 1988, the ABA Commission on
Women in the Profession issued its first report.30 9 The report found
that discrimination is still widespread, and that most discrimination
today is subtle and a reflection of co-workers' attitudes. 310 It found
that women were more likely than men to perceive sex discrimination,
and that women were under-represented in the judiciary, law faculty
and law firm partnerships. 311 Unfortunately, not a great deal had
changed between the time when the Committee issued its first report
and its second report in 1995.312
Even the federal government has begun to study these issues in
earnest. As part of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the federal govern-
ment created the Federal Glass Ceiling Commission to study bias in
corporate America.3 13 A report issued by the Department of Labor
showed dramatic statistical evidence that the glass ceiling continued
305. See id. at 1399-1407.
306. See id.
307. See id. at 1391-93. For a compendium of recommendations by the various federal
gender bias task forces, see Schafran, supra note 290, 636-37 (recommending ongoing
training forjudges and court personnel, adopting court rules making biased conduct unac-
ceptable, improving grievance procedures for complaints against judges and court person-
nel for biased conduct, striving for diversity in appointments, adopting sexual harassment
policies, and establishing Circuit-wide committees on fairness).
308. Robert A. Stein, Advancing Women's Opportunities, A.B.A. J., May 1998, at 96.
309. See Stephanie Benson Goldberg, Gender Bias: ABA Commission Issues First Report,
A.B.A.J., Oct. 1, 1988, at 144.
310. See id.
311. See id.
312. See UNFINISHED BUSINESS, supra note 4.
313. See Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1072 (1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
(1994)).
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to be a reality for women, with women representing less than seven
percent of upper-level management.31 4
These reports, collectively, demonstrate the pervasiveness of gen-
der bias. Documenting the existence of bias is the first step. As the
reports make clear, men do not perceive the problem to exist to the
same extent as women, if they acknowledge that it exists at all.3 15 With-
out these reports, and others like them, we would still very much be at
the starting gate, for until a problem is identified, there can be no
solution.
There is certainly no shortage of gender bias studies. For over a
decade, federal and state courts as well as national and local bar as-
sociations have studied gender bias and issued comprehensive re-
ports. While the findings show varying degrees of gender bias, the
universal conclusion is that we will continue to have a problem with
gender bias in the courts and in the profession generally, and that
time alone will not eradicate the problem.3 16 Now the challenge is to
implement the findings in the reports and continue to take remedial
action. Fortunately, the California Judicial Council and the Ninth Cir-
cuit have made implementation of the gender bias report recommen-
dations a priority. While progress has been steady, the task is far from
over.
IV. The Road to Equality
To move beyond today's achievements and to ensure the fear of
backsliding does not become a reality,3 17 changes need to continue in
many facets of the legal profession.318 While not all women have the
same goals, several themes have emerged as being of paramount im-
314. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, REPORT ON THE GLASS CEILING INITIATIVE (1991) at 6; see
also U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, PIPELINES OF PROGRESS: AN UPDATE ON THE GLASS CEILING INITIA-
TWE (1992).
315. See generally Rhode, supra note 109, at A19 (reviewing three recent reports on gen-
der bias in the legal profession, Professor Rhode notes that denial by lawyers that there is a
serious problem is itself a serious problem); see alsoJUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, supra
note 7, at 110-11 (demonstrating graphically that women judges perceive biased behavior
by judges and other lawyers much more frequently than do men judges).
316. See Rhode, supra note 109, at A19. "[I]f time alone is viewed as the answer, we are
in for a very long wait." Id.
317. Some commentators argue that backsliding is already occurring in some fields.
See, e.g., Dunlap, supra note 239, at 703 (pointing out that women broke into many tradi-
tionally male jobs in the 1970's, but are no longer there). The author argues that Title VII
allowed women to get hired, but pervasive sexual harassment resulted in many women
quitting. See id.
318. In her introduction to the 1995 Report entitled "Note from the Chair," Laurel G.
Bellows, Chair of the ABA Commission on Women in the Profession, stated:
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portance in ensuring women are treated equally and achieve satisfac-
tion in the legal profession.
In the absence of a significant and rapid societal change, which is
unlikely,3 19 or a reversal of the direction in the way in which federal
courts analyze Title VII claims involving upper-level management de-
cisions,320 change will have to occur in the profession itself. Changing
the ways in which the legal profession does business in this country
will not only allow women to reach their full potential, but will also
have the salutary effect of making the profession as a whole more hu-
mane to both men and women.321
Since legal careers begin in law school, legal educators are in a
unique position to influence how we think about our profession. The
American Bar Association Commission on Women in the Profession's
seminal report on bias in law schools states, "Future generations of
our profession are molded in law school . . . .The legal academy
should represent the highest standards of our profession." 322 The
American Bar Association has called on law schools to evaluate their
schools in terms of the environment for women. 323
Societal change is seldom welcome .... But change in the status of women in the
legal profession is imperative. In the intervening seven years since the Commis-
sion's last report, the professional life of women lawyers has not materially im-
proved. Neither the sheer number of female law school graduates, nor the mere
passage of time, nor even the elevation of individual women to positions of prom-
inence has dramatically enhanced opportunities for women as partners, law
professors or judges.
UNFINISHED BUSINESS, supra note 4, at 2.
319. One author has observed that, "We seem, as a society, a remarkably complacent
lot. We are forever slow to recognize problems and forever fast to write them off. We like
things the way they are, by and large, and we don't like change, certainly not the kind of
change sought by some disgruntled faction ...." McCaffrey, supra note 202, at 289.
320. See, e.g., Rhode, Perspectives on Professional Women, supra note 109; see also Baron,
supra note 171, at 268-269 (arguing that the inherent difficulty in assessing upper-level
management decisions does not justify the court's abdication of its review role in these
cases).
321. See UNFINISHED BUSINESS, supra note 4, at 17.
The 1988 status report emphasized that balancing work and family was an issue of
concern to all people, not just women .... Yet, seven years have passed and little
change is evident. The Commission still believes that, philosophically, these issues
relate to everyone; in reality, women bear the greater burden of prioritizing work
and family. And, women suffer the most from this daily balancing act.
Id.
322. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, ELUSIVE
EQUALIT. THE EXPERIENCES OF WOMEN IN LEGAL EDUCATION EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND REC-
OMMENDATIONS, at 7 (1996) [hereinafter ELUSIVE EQUALITY].
323. See American Bar Association Commission on Women in the Profession, Don't
Just Hear It Through the Grapevine: Studying Gender Questions at Your Law School (Jan.
1998).
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Many commentators have suggested we reevaluate the prevailing
method of teaching law students.3 24 We might adopt casebooks sensi-
tive to bias issues. Each law student should receive training in the
elimination of bias. 325 Other suggestions include: each dean creating
a Committee on Gender, improving career services, creating more co-
curricular opportunities for women, and reforming faculty hiring,
evaluation and promotion.3 26 Furthermore, schools should take steps
to ensure harassment or biased conduct by fellow students is not
tolerated.3 27
As far as private law firm employment is concerned, firms should
begin to institute family-friendly policies, such as emergency childcare
provisions and parental leave policies.3 28 In its seminal report, the
Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force found that "[w]hether or not
men and women can comfortably raise families while employed
outside the home depends significantly on the presence of policies
that support family life: parental leave, child-care availability, accept-
ance of part-time employment, and flexible work schedules."3 29 Given
the demographics of the profession, with the overwhelming majority
324. In Engendering Change, Catharine A. MacKinnon states that "[t]he so-called So-
cratic method has been found to differentially silence women students and, through hu-
miliation and abuse, to school all law students in hierarchy and authoritarian thinking
rather than in the ability to bring their lives to their work and to think for themselves."
MacKinnon, supra note 98, at 91.
325. See RHODE, supra note 38, at 167.
326. See ELUSIVE EQUALrrY, supra note 322, at 6-7; see also Mertz et al., supra note 122
(finding that race and gender impact student inclusion in law school classes, and that law
schools can modify what goes on in the classroom to ensure inclusion).
327. One professor has opined that her school's more "humane" law school environ-
ment has contributed to the fact that women and minorities fare particularly well at that
school. Some of the institutional attributes that contribute to such an environment include
the existence of a mentoring program for students, a low student-faculty ratio, a diverse
faculty, and a faculty that is available to students. SeeJudith D. Fischer, Portia Unbound: The
Effects of a Supportive Law School Environment on Women and Minority Law Students, 7 U.C.L.A.
WOMEN'S L.J. 81, 82-83 (1996).
328. This is particularly important in large firms, as work and family pressures are con-
sidered to be worse in large firms than in small firms. See Final Report of the Ninth Circuit,
supra note 12, at 844. The report also found that only eight percent of employers provide
child care assistance. See id. at 843.
While some firms experimented with the so-called "mommy-track," discussed supra
Part II.C.2., there is a growing consensus that the "mommy-track" is a poor solution to the
problem, as it is the result of stereotypical notions of a woman's role in society and the
workplace, and in fact perpetuates those notions. See Korzec, supra note 199; Heidi Hook-
man Brodsky, Women Struggle to Make it to the Top, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 19, 1992, at S39; see also
Rhode, supra note 109, at A19 ("All three [gender bias] reports describe, in deadening and
depressing detail, the sweatshop hours expected of full-time attorneys and the second-class
status imposed on part-time practioners.").
329. Final Report of the Ninth Circuit, supra note 12, at 837.
Fall 1999]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
of women lawyers under fifty, law firm support of family life is particu-
larly critical in retaining women. 330
Several governmental agencies have already implemented family-
friendly policies, making government work an attractive option for
many women. 331 Only in making firm life less onerous for women with
families will the profession alter the status quo in large firms where
those women who make partner are "overwhelmingly single and child-
less." 332 In addition to enacting policies, the firm management must,
by word and deed, assure those who take advantage of the policies
that they will not be penalized for doing so. 333 As more firms develop
and implement these policies, it is likely that more men will take ad-
vantage of them as well as the women in the firm.
Firms should also avoid the so-called "mommy-track." As dis-
cussed above, the "mommy-track" creates a category of second-class
firm citizens. Studies have shown that women who opt for the"mommy-track" suffer considerably in terms of assignments, promo-
tions and opportunities, leading to low self-esteem and, often, depar-
ture from the firm.334 One commentator has stated that the "mommy-
track" will reinforce exploitation of women lawyers, resulting in a top
rung of managers who are either men or women without children and
a "pink collar ghetto of lawyers who are mothers."335
Furthermore, significant changes are more likely to occur with
women in leadership positions.336 More women must seek the posi-
330. See id. The report also found that only a tiny percentage of men (1%-4%) said
that they experienced professional problems, such as delay in promotion, pressure to re-
turn to work from parental leave and pressure to work during parental leave. A much
larger percentage of women (5%-29%) stated that they had experienced these problems.
See id. at 849.
331. See UNFINISHED BuSINESS, supra note 4, at 14, 17 (noting that even if a firm has
policies in place, they are not being used, and that the profession stands almost exactly
where it did when the Commission issued its report in 1988).
332. NOSSEL & WESTFALL, supra note 148, at xx. The Ninth Circuit Task force found
that women judges are also less likely to be married and less likely to have children than
their male colleagues. See Final Report of the Ninth Circuit, supra note 12, at 772.
333. See NOSSEL & WESTFALL, supra note 148, at 206. Associates at a large Los Angeles
firm indicated that the firm had a part-time policy, but few took advantage of it because of
upper management's negative attitude about it. See id.
334. See Korzec, supra note 199, at 127 nn.56-58.
335. Id. at 127 (citing Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REv. 797, 828
(1989) (quoting Mary C. Hickey, The Dilemma of Having it All, WASH. LAW., May-June 1988,
at 59)).
336. See NOSSEL & WESTFALL, supra note 148, at xxii (noting that very few women are
powerbrokers in their firms).
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tion of managing partner, despite the drawbacks of this position.337
From this position, women can help create family-friendly flexible
working environments and make the workplace more friendly for wo-
men associates. Women managing partners can accomplish this
change by leading with a less authoritarian or dictatorial style than
their male counterparts and by consensus building.338
Additionally, as technology advances, so do the opportunities to
work from home through laptop computers and e-mail. Increased util-
ization of these technological improvements would save time spent
commuting, and allow lawyers to spend more time with their families
and pursuing personal interests. The requirement of spending over
3,000 hours per year at the workplace can be substantially reduced
without a concomitant reduction in productivity.
Firms should institute mentoring programs. While some already
have, others have not. For example, at Latham & Watkins, a firm
which women lawyers ranked seventy-second out of seventy-seven law
firms, 339 a former managing partner eschewed the idea of assigning
mentors, stating that "[o] ur experience is that mentoring has to hap-
pen naturally."340 However, some argue that even an involuntary
mentoring relationship is important in that it assists women by provid-
ing an opening to opportunities.3 4' By contrast, the firm that ranked
first in the nation, Chicago's Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal, has
made mentoring of its women lawyers a priority.342 Mentoring is as
critical to advancement in law as it is in any other profession.
Additionally, firms must carefully monitor the quality of assign-
ments that women associates receive. An associate who is given less-
than-desirable assignments is at a distinct disadvantage in the competi-
tion for partnership. Women must be given the same opportunity as
men to demonstrate their abilities. While we are a long way from the
days when firms did not allow women attorneys to go to court and
relegated them to probate and family law departments, there is evi-
337. See Patricia G. Barnes, From Outsider to Insider: More Firms are Appointing Women
Managing Partners, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1996, at 24 (reporting that more women are becoming
managing partners, but that the position isn't as powerful as it used to be, and that the
enormous administrative duties detract from billable hours and practice of law).
338. See id. at 24-25.
339. See NOSSEL & WESTFALL, supra note 148, at 203.
340. Gabriel, supra note 155, at A7.
341. See id.
342. See id.
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dence that women associates often receive fewer desirable assign-
ments than men associates. 343
Firms must understand that in the long run these changes will be
enormously beneficial if they result in the retention of qualified wo-
men lawyers. There is no doubt reduced hours, childcare and other
accommodations will be costly to the firms. However, as the California
Judicial Council found, firms are already suffering from the drain of
trained associates who leave to have families. 344 Similarly, a recent sur-
vey of women at large law firms revealed that attrition is perceived as a
widespread problem. 345 Firms should accommodate associates during
childbearing years to assure continuity over the long-term. 346 Addi-
tionally, alternatives to the billable hour model may assist firms in re-
taining both qualified men and women without sacrificing the bottom
line.3 4 7
Firms must recognize that gender bias can indeed be detrimental
to business. As Justice Sandra Day O'Connor observed, "gender bias is
depriving us of the talent and skills that otherwise qualified women
343. See NOSSEL & WESTFALL, supra note 148, at xviii.
Some respondents reported full satisfaction with the level of work they have been
assigned, but others suggested that women litigators do research and writing
while men do depositions and court appearances, and women corporate lawyers
work on due diligence while their male peers are negotiating deals. In some cases,
the disparity was attributed to partners' perceptions of women's capabilities and
their ability to win the confidence of clients.
Id. See Rhode, supra note 109, at A19 (reviewing three comprehensive gender bias reports
that document the fact that women lawyers often receive inferior assignments); see also
Ezold v. Wold, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 751 F. Supp. 1175, 1178-79 (E.D. Pa. 1990),
rev'd, 983 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 88 (1993). The districtjudge noted
that the partners' perception that Ms. Ezold could not grasp complex issues or handle
complex cases was attributable to the fact that she was assigned only to non-complex mat-
ters. See id.
344. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, supra note 7, at 103; see also Deborah K.
Holmes, Structural Causes of Dissatisfaction Among Large-Firm Attorneys: A Feminist Perspective,
12 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 9, 23-24 (1990) (noting that women are twice as likely as men to
think about leaving an associate position with a large firm).
345. See NOSSEL & WESTFALL, supra note 148, at xix.
346. However, the "mommy-track" is not the solution. Those women are treated as
second class citizens at the firm, and the entire concept reinforces the concept of women
as primarily responsible for home and children. See Holmes, supra note 344, at 34.
347. Fixed fee billing and value billing (fee established taking into account result, time
expended, expertise of the attorney, etc.) are alternatives which some authors suggest as
viable alternatives to the billable hour model. See Foster, supra note 172, at 1681; Korzec,
supra note 199, at 136-37; see also UNFINISHED BUSINESS, supra note 4, at 12 (noting that the
billable hour criterion for assessing performance "negatively impacts on women who carry
a greater proportion of responsibilities at home").
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could be contributing." 348 Not only will firms lose the expertise of
these talented women lawyers, they may well lose clients, such as wo-
men and minority owned businesses who would rather retain a firm
that has women and minorities in leadership positions.
The profession should undertake a thorough review of its rules of
professional responsibility, and where not inconsistent with the First
Amendment, subject lawyers to disciplinary proceedings for engaging
in conduct exhibiting bias while performing official duties as mem-
bers of the bar. These rules would provide judges and lawyers with
mechanisms for dealing with biased behavior.3 49 Additionally, local
bar associations should establish gender equity committees to mediate
and attempt to informally resolve instances of gender bias by local
judges or lawyers. 350
Furthermore, efforts to educate lawyers on issues of bias should
be paramount. While the California judiciary has made such educa-
tion the centerpiece of its efforts to eliminate bias from the court sys-
tem, the practicing bar should follow suit. Law schools, law firms, bar
associations, bar sections and continuing education providers should
educate law students and lawyers not only about the laws prohibiting
discrimination, but also about the more subtle, subconscious stere-
otyping which prevents true equality among lawyers.3 5 1 As Deborah
Rhode has pointed out, these "[u] nconscious gender stereotypes work
in similar ways to prevent women from breaking through the glass
ceiling and to prevent men from seeing that any ceiling exists."3 52
348. Hon. Sandra Day O'Connor, The Quality of Justice, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 759, 760
(1994).
349. For a discussion of the need for rules in this area, see Jackson, supra note 290, at
19-20.
350. For example, in Orange County, California, the local bar association has in place
such a process, with a standing committee of the bar to receive, investigate and attempt to
resolve issues of gender bias in the local legal community.
351. See Final Report of the Ninth Circuit, supra note 12, at 965 (finding that education is
critical in eradicating bias, and should be directed at law students as well as the bench and
bar).
352. RHODE, supra note 38, at 145. Professor Rhode concludes that these unconscious
stereotypes prevent accurate assessment of work performance, because people tend to in-
terpret data in such a way so as to support preconceived notions about the characteristics
of the group to whom the person being evaluated belongs. See id.
See also Final Report of the Ninth Circuit, supra note 12, at 964 (finding that since male
judges, as men, are not generally victims of gender bias, they fail to recognize its existence
as it occurs).
Similarly, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, in commenting on the failure of women to
attain partnership, opined that "most partners believe they are making gender neutral de-
cisions. They simply do not realize that their image of as [sic] 'partner' may work to ex-
clude women." O'Connor, supra note 348, at 760.
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Efforts must be redoubled to diversify the bench.35 3 Women law-
yers will gain acceptance in the courtroom as more women join the
bench.3 54 One commentator, in remarking that women judges are
powerful role models for all court participants, stated that "[lt]he in-
creasing numbers of women judges in most of the nation's court sys-
tems... itself has the potential to change societal stereotypes of what
women do. '3 55
It is more critical than ever that organizations such as the Califor-
nia Judicial Council, California Women Lawyers, the State Bar of Cali-
fornia and local women's bar organizations continue to undertake
systematic studies in this area, publicize results, and make recommen-
dations for improvement. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, in noting the
important role of these types of studies and reports, stated that self-
study "heightens appreciation that progress does not occur automati-
cally, but requires a concerted effort to change habitual modes of
thinking and acting. '356
As manifestations of gender bias become more subtle, the neces-
sity for studies and reports on gender increases. It is important to
present a macro view of the status of women in this profession, as the
facts of isolated cases, standing alone, do not necessarily tell the full
story. One woman associate's denial of partnership may be explaina-
ble with reference to that individual attorney's lack of analytical abil-
ity, failure to engage in rainmaking activity, or other factors. However,
evidence that a tiny percentage of women achieve partnership in a
given locale is much more telling.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, women must resist com-
placency. It is a mistake to think that time alone will result in gender
parity in the profession. The presence of increasingly greater numbers
of women in the profession will certainly have a positive effect,357 but
353. SeeJuDIcIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, supra note 7, at 107-12. For a general discus-
sion, see Julie Gould, Experience with Gender Bias Sparks Mission of New Judicial-Group Chair,
Chi. Daily L. Bull., Sept. 24, 1993, at 1; see also UNFINISHED BUSINESS, supra note 4, at 14
(noting that 31% of President Clinton's appointees have been women, as a result of which
women now comprise 12% of the federal bench).
354. See Pines, supra note 117.
355. Jackson, supra note 290, at 21.
356. Id. at 16 (citing Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Foreword, 84 GEO. L. J. 1651, 1652
(1996)); see also Dunlap, supra note 239, at 694 (noting the critical nature of conducting
periodic demographic studies: "Who is on the bench? Who is in the jury box? Who is
litigating, and who is representing them? Who is testifying? Who is the expert? ... [W]ho is
being excluded? What voices are being silenced, muted or distorted ... ?").
357. In fact, by the year 2010, it is predicted that 40% of the nation's lawyers will be
women. See WOMEN IN THE LAw, supra note 7, at 6.
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will not solve the underlying reasons for women's failure to shatter the
glass ceiling.3 58 As one author stated, "In some sense, the American
women's movement is a victim of its own success. Its accomplishments
have undercut the urgency of further struggle." 359 She argues that the
progress women have made is in itself an obstacle to further change in
that there is a sense that we have solved the problem with gender in-
equity. 360 Thus, "[u]nless women take control of their own profes-
sional destiny, successive generations will replay the uphill struggle of
Sisyphus. 361
Conclusion
Despite unprecedented gains during the past thirty years, women
lawyers in California have failed to achieve true parity with their male
counterparts, particularly at the upper echelons of the profession. Wo-
men comprise half of law school classes, but relatively small percent-
ages of partners in large firms, judges, law school faculty and deans,
and practitioners in certain fields. Time, greater numbers, and legal
protections have all worked to dramatically improve the abilities of
women to gain acceptance in this profession. However, these factors
alone will not totally eradicate gender bias in the legal field.
Societal reasons contribute to the slow rate of progress by women
in the legal field. As a society, we continue to view women as primarily
responsible for the home and family while viewing men as wage earn-
ers. We also see characteristics normally attributed to successful law-
yers-aggressive, determined, single-minded in dedication to career-
as incompatible with characteristics of women. These stereotypes, nat-
urally, invade the workplace.
The culture of the legal profession itself impedes women lawyers'
ability to succeed in the legal field to the same degree as men. The
requirement of 2000 to 2400 billable hours per year, lack of child and
358. Similarly, it is wrong to assume that the younger generation who will eventually
populate the profession will behave in radically different ways. A leading expert on bias in
the court system, Lynn Hecht Schafran, stated that it is a misconception to believe that
today's youth will solve the gender bias problem, citing a study showing that men under
and over forty years of age share the same attitudes toward women. See M.A. Stapleton,
Gender Bias in the Courts Not GoingAway Anytime Soon, Experts Warn, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Dec.
5, 1994, at 3.
359. RHODE, supra note 38, at 14.
360. See id. at 1. The author goes on to state that this attitude that there is no longer a
problem with gender inequity prevents us "from noticing that on every major measure of
wealth, power, and status, women still are significantly worse off than men." Id. at 2.
361. UNFINISHED BUSINESS, supra note 4, at 3.
Fall 1999] GENDER EQUITY
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
family friendly policies, lack of mentoring opportunities and the im-
portance of rainmaking all make it difficult for women associates, par-
ticularly those who wish to have families, to achieve partnership.
The Judicial Council of California, federal gender bias task
forces, as well as task forces of other states and bar associations, have
contributed to a greater understanding of the realities of life for wo-
men lawyers. A thorough understanding of these issues is critical to
achieving solutions. Progress has been made in implementing the re-
ports. All jurisdictions must continue to implement the existing re-
ports, and begin to plan to update the reports, as many are now nearly
a decade old.
In spite of the laudable efforts of these organizations, now is not
the time to sit back and compliment one another on ajob well done.
Much work remains ahead. The hope for the future is in new lawyers.
As one California lawyer recently stated, "The new generation of wo-
men lawyers is young, brash, confident, and smart. They are not about
to make the sacrifices that earlier generations of female professionals
often made, such as foregoing personal relationships and mother-
hood .... [T] hey merely want the same thing their male colleagues
take for granted."362 In bringing about these much needed changes
for women lawyers, one can only hope that the result will be a more
humane profession for all lawyers.3 63
362. Becker, supra note 37, at 37.
363. The notion that the women lawyers could alter the existing model of the legal
profession to one that is far more humane was the subject of Carrie Menkel-Meadow's
article entitled, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculation on a Woman's Lawyering Process, 1 BERKE-
LEY WOMEN'S L.. 39 (1985).
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